Symmetric mechanism design
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.007
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Cited by:
- Yaron Azrieli, 2018. "The price of ‘one person, one vote’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 353-385, February.
- Korpela, Ville, 2018. "Procedurally fair implementation under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 25-31.
- Korpela Ville, 2016. "Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry," Discussion Papers 108, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Chen, Bo & Knyazev, Dmitriy, 2023. "Symmetric mechanism design: Comment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
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Keywords
Mechanism design; Symmetry; Fairness; Revelation principle;All these keywords.
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