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Transparent Matching Mechanisms

Author

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  • Markus Möller

Abstract

In a standard one-to-one agent-object matching model, I consider a central matching authority that publicly announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then initiates a matching. Following Akbarpour and Li (2020), the authority's commitment to the announced mechanism is limited to mechanisms rendering participants' observations indistinguishable from it. I call an announced mechanism transparent if any deviation from it would be detected. The main findings identify trade-offs regarding transparency and other desirable properties: Under stability or efficiency, strategy-proof mechanisms are transparent if and only if they are dictatorial. However, at the same time, the agent-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism is tantamount to commiting to stability, while efficient mechanisms often fail to commit to efficiency. This transparency trade-off between stability and efficiency persists when strategy-proofness is guaranteed.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Möller, 2025. "Transparent Matching Mechanisms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_666, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_666
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp666
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Transparency; Strategy-Proof; Stability; Efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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