Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

Citations

Cited by:

1. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
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   • Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-381, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
   • KAYABA, Yutaka & 萱場, 豊 & MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi & TOYAMA, Tomohisa, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-23, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
   • Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1056, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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   • Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-04331552, HAL.
5. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2007. "Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 382-413, July.
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7. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
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14. Anton M Unakafov & Thomas Schultze & Alexander Gail & Sebastian Moeller & Igor Kagan & Stephan Eule & Fred Wolf, 2020. "Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(1), pages 1-32, January.
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25. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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