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The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 16, pages 345-367, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  2. Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2009. "Switching costs in infinitely repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 292-314, May.
  3. Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa, 2020. "A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1129-1142, December.
  4. Stähler, Frank & Wagner, Friedrich, 1998. "Cooperation in a resource extraction game," Kiel Working Papers 846, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  5. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
  6. Cesi Berardino & Iozzi Alberto & Valentini Edilio, 2012. "Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, September.
  7. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers 96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  8. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
  9. Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 400-424.
  10. Aramendia, Miguel, 2006. "Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-239, August.
  11. Miguel Aramendia, 2008. "Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 293-304, April.
  12. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2018. "Repetition and cooperation: A model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 585, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  13. Quan Wen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Asynchronous Moves," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0204, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  14. Zhonghao SHUI, 2020. "Degree-K subgame perfect Nash equilibria and the folk theorem," Discussion papers e-20-001, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
  15. Kimmo Berg, 2017. "Extremal Pure Strategies and Monotonicity in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 387-404, March.
  16. John Payne Bigelow, 1996. "Value Oriented Equilibria in Repeated Games of Complete Information," Game Theory and Information 9607003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Chen, Bo, 2008. "On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 105-107, July.
  18. Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
  19. Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D., 2011. "On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 287-295, September.
  20. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-14.
  21. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2010. "A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences," MPRA Paper 38389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.
  23. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2018. "A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 584, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  24. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April.
  25. Berardino Cesi & Adriano Di Natale, 2019. "Transparency in repeated procurement: when hiding is better," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(1), pages 14-23.
  26. Takahashi, Satoru & Wen, Quan, 2003. "On asynchronously repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 239-245, May.
  27. Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
  28. Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2006. "Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 100-111, April.
  29. Aramendia, Miguel, 2008. "Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 246-248, May.
  30. Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2006. "Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-003, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  31. Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.
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