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Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem

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Cited by:

  1. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Marek Bojko & Paul DŸtting & Renato Paes Leme & Haifeng Xu & Song Zuo, 2024. "Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2418, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Morita Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 838, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
  5. Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2018. "Sender–receiver games with cooperation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 52-61.
  6. Ehud Kalai, 2006. "Structural Robustness of Large Games," Discussion Papers 1431, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2021. "Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E006, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
  8. Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  9. Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2001. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 219-240, August.
  10. Kei Kawakami, 2016. "Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 893-931, November.
  11. Johannes Hörner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Mediation and Peace," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(4), pages 1483-1501.
  12. Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi, 2022. "Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  13. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 182-206, February.
  14. Robert Shimer & Ivan Werning, 2019. "Efficiency and information transmission in bilateral trading," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 154-176, July.
  15. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 127-136, March.
  16. Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
  17. Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  18. Bergemann, Dirk & Wambach, Achim, 2015. "Sequential information disclosure in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 1074-1095.
  19. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Protocol Design and (De-)Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 6357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Kei Kawakami, 2013. "Maximally Informative Decision Rules In a Two-Person Decision Problem," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1178, The University of Melbourne, revised 2014.
  21. Lee, Logan M. & Waddell, Glen R., 2021. "Diversity and the timing of preference in hiring decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 432-459.
  22. Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
  23. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275717, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
  24. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
  25. Ehud Kalai, 2005. "Partially-Specified Large Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000565, UCLA Department of Economics.
  26. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Haile, Philip A. & Riley, John G., 2002. "Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 19-27, January.
  27. Paul S. Koh, 2022. "Stable Outcomes and Information in Games: An Empirical Framework," Papers 2205.04990, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
  28. Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
  29. Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000391, UCLA Department of Economics.
  30. Minehart, Deborah & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1999. "Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 114-131, April.
  31. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny & Zame, William R., 2007. "Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 70-73, October.
  32. Heumann, Tibor, 2019. "An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  33. Lebrun, Bernard, 2012. "Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 731-751.
  34. Picard Pierre & Rey Patrick, 1987. "Incentives in cooperative research and development," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8739, CEPREMAP.
  35. Deb, Joyee & Kalai, Ehud, 2015. "Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1041-1055.
  36. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
  37. Dirk Bergemann & Marek Bojko & Paul Dutting & Renato Paes Leme & Haifeng Xu & Song Zuo, 2024. "Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information," Papers 2412.16132, arXiv.org.
  38. Koh, Paul S., 2023. "Stable outcomes and information in games: An empirical framework," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 237(1).
  39. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  40. Robert Evans & Sonje Reiche, 2013. "Mechanism Design and Non-Cooperative Renegotiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1331, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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