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Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  2. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-252, May.
  3. Bichler, Martin & Gretschko, Vitali & Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 325-340.
  4. Jacob Goeree & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2013. "Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(1), pages 52-87, March.
  5. David Pardoe & Peter Stone & Maytal Saar-Tsechansky & Tayfun Keskin & Kerem Tomak, 2010. "Adaptive Auction Mechanism Design and the Incorporation of Prior Knowledge," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 22(3), pages 353-370, August.
  6. Raphaële Préget, 2004. "Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 63-110.
  7. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June.
  8. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
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