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Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle
Citations
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Cited by:
- Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment: Extending to the Multi-Period Case," Diskussionsschriften dp1402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006.
"Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2004. "Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2003-02-FC, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2005-09-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/245733, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2003.
"Auction Design without Commitment,"
Working Papers
2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014.
"Delegation and dynamic incentives,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
- Strausz, Roland & Shin, Dongsoo, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 9929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 4774, CESifo.
- Wolinsky, Asher, 2002.
"Eliciting information from multiple experts,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Moriya, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利, 2007. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," Working Paper Series 061, Center for Japanese Business Studies (HJBS), Graduate School of Commerce and Management Hitotsubashi University.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013.
"The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2009. "The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector," UC3M Working papers. Economics we096742, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Post-Print hal-00710639, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00710639, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-190, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00710639, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 637, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Martimort, David & Ivaldi, Marc & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2010. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 8042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016.
"Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3238-3274, November.
- Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016. "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01509599, HAL.
- Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016. "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," Post-Print halshs-01509599, HAL.
- Skreta, Vasiliki, 2015.
"Optimal auction design under non-commitment,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 854-890.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," UCLA Economics Online Papers 346, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000176, David K. Levine.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers 08-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2013. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers 13-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2006.
"On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 168-204, September.
- Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000067, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1404, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Madhav S. Aney, 2012. "Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach," Working Papers 18-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016.
"Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 725-841,
Elsevier.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski & Nicolas Werquin, 2016. "Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 22012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012.
"Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 251, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2000. "Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 165-171, November.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2017.
"From fixed to state‐dependent duration in public‐private partnerships,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 636-660, September.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2015. "From fixed to state-dependent duration in public-private partnerships," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201504, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Annalisa Vinella & Daniel Danau, 2017. "From fixed to state-dependent duration in public-private partnerships," Post-Print halshs-02268001, HAL.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2015. "From fixed to state-dependent duration in public-private partnerships," SERIES 01-2015, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Jan 2015.
- Yaron Leitner, 2010. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 10-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Alexander Karaivanov & Fernando Martin, 2015.
"Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 287-305, April.
- Fernando M. Martin & Alexander Karaivanov, 2007. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," 2007 Meeting Papers 793, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Alexander K. Karaivanov & Fernando M. Martin, 2011. "Dynamic optimal insurance and lack of commitment," Working Papers 2011-029, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Alexander K. Karaivanov & Fernando M. Martin, 2007. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," Discussion Papers dp07-22, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Jean Tirole, 2016.
"From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening With Positive Selection,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1291-1343, July.
- Jean Tirole, 2016. "From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening With Positive Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84(4), pages 1291-1343, July.
- Tirole, Jean, 2016. "From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening with Positive Selection," TSE Working Papers 16-672, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Krähmer, Daniel, 2002. "Delegation versus authority [Delegation versus Autorität]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-26, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2010.
"The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts,"
Working Papers
hal-00622961, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2010. "The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00622961, HAL.
- repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
- Johannes Hörner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2015.
"Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1795-1848, September.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2015.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2014. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000881, David K. Levine.
- Hori, Kazumi & 堀, 一三, 2006. "The Bright Side of Private Benefits," Discussion Papers 2006-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Martin Pollrich, 2017.
"Mediated audits,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 44-68, March.
- Martin Pollrich, "undated". "Mediated Audits," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015003, Berlin School of Economics.
- Pollrich, Martin, 2015. "Mediated Audits," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 809, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2003.
"Enforcement, Regulation and Development,"
Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 12(Supplemen), pages 193-211, September.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Enforcement, Regulation and Development," IDEI Working Papers 129, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society.
- Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2008.
"Veto-based delegation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 297-307, January.
- Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2005. "Veto-Based Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 129, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Schiller, Jörg, 2004. "Versicherungsbetrug als ökonomisches Problem: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 13, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
- Patrick Leoni, "undated". "Banking Regulation without Commitment to Audit," IEW - Working Papers 251, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Karel Janda, 2006. "Optimal Deterministic Debt Contracts," Working Papers IES 2006/25, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Oct 2006.
- Dai Zusai, 2012. "Excess Liquidity against Predation," DETU Working Papers 1201, Department of Economics, Temple University.
- Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2015. "Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-)Negotiation," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113064, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment," Diskussionsschriften dp1401, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- repec:hal:pseose:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS