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When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wagner, Alexander K. & Granic, Dura-Georg, 2017. "Tie-Breaking Power in Committees," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168187, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Michela Redoano, 2010. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 407-435, June.
  3. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
  4. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Xefteris, Dimitris, 2021. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," SocArXiv ubk7p, Center for Open Science.
  5. Mr. Ben Lockwood & Mr. Eric Le Borgne, 2003. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns," IMF Working Papers 2003/057, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001.
  7. Laurent Denant-Boemont & Enrico Diecidue & Olivier l’Haridon, 2017. "Patience and time consistency in collective decisions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(1), pages 181-208, March.
  8. Elkind, Edith & Grandi, Umberto & Rossi, Francesca & Slinko, Arkadii, 2020. "Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 193-205.
  9. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
  10. Christian Basteck, 2016. "Scoring rules and implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Working Papers 2016002, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
  11. Amani Kahloul & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Hejer Lasram & Didier Laussel, 2017. "Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 860-874, August.
  12. M. Braham & F. Steffen, 2007. "The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(2), pages 231-253, February.
  13. Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2000. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 582, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  14. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
  15. Sébastien Courtin & Matías Núñez, 2017. "Dominance solvable approval voting games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(6), pages 1047-1068, December.
  16. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
  17. Dellis, Arnaud, 2010. "Weak undominance in scoring rule elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 110-119, January.
  18. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2012. "Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2012-40, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  19. Neelam Gohar & Gul E. Saman & Salma Noor & Sehrish Aslam & Maryam Khan & Anam Qadeer & Fawad Qayum, 2019. "Analysis of dynamics of voting system for small number of candidates," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 225-246, September.
  20. Kei Kawai & Yasutora Watanabe, 2013. "Inferring Strategic Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 624-662, April.
  21. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 889-909, April.
  22. Christian Basteck, 2022. "Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 161-208, July.
  23. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, 2022. "The Trembling Chairman Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 51-56.
  24. Bryan McCannon, 2009. "Can the majority lose the election?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 305-317, December.
  25. Joaquín Pérez & Omar De la Cruz, 2014. "Implementation of Jefferson-d’Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 17-30, January.
  26. Arzumanyan, Mariam & Polborn, Mattias K., 2017. "Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 38-50.
  27. Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida, 2013. "Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 329-352, February.
  28. le Borgne, E. & Lockwood, B., 2000. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 580, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  29. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
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