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Cognition and Incomplete Contracts

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Cited by:

  1. Oliver J. Board & Kim-Sau Chung, 2021. "Object-based unawareness: Axioms," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 6(1), pages 1-36, December.
  2. Barney Hartman‐Glaser & Benjamin Hébert, 2020. "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(1), pages 463-506, February.
  3. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
  4. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2009. "Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2193-2208, December.
  5. Toru Suzuki, 2020. "Efficiently Imprecise Contracts," Working Paper Series 2020/07, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
  6. Stefano Mengoli & Marco Pagano & Pierpaolo Pattitoni, 2021. "The Geography of Investor Attention," EIEF Working Papers Series 2114, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Nov 2021.
  7. Aziz N. Berdiev & Rajeev K. Goel & James W. Saunoris, 2022. "Do disease epidemics force economic activity underground? International evidence," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(2), pages 263-282, April.
  8. Galanis, Spyros, 2018. "Speculation under unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 598-615.
  9. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001479, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Liang Guo, 2022. "Strategic Communication Before Price Haggling: A Tale of Two Orientations," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(5), pages 922-940, September.
  11. Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2014. "Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 484, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  12. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2016. "Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 85-100.
  13. Li, Sanxi & Peitz, Martin & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2010. "Worried about Adverse Product Effects? Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness," TSE Working Papers 10-157, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  14. Botond Köszegi, 2014. "Behavioral Contract Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1075-1118, December.
  15. Rajan, Uday & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2015. "The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 237-260.
  16. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling with costly acquisition of signals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 141-150.
  17. Massimo Warglien, 2013. "Language and economic organization," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  18. Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2017. "Auctions versus Negotiations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 12, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  19. Beccherle, Julien & Tirole, Jean, 2011. "Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1339-1348.
  20. Carlo Prato & Bruno Strulovici, 2017. "The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 440-466, July.
  21. Alexia Gaudeul, 2009. "A (Micro) Course in Microeconomic Theory for MSc Students," Working Papers id:1986, eSocialSciences.
  22. Li, Sanxi & Peitz, Martin & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2016. "Information disclosure and consumer awareness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 209-230.
  23. Xeni Dassiou & Jon Stern, 2009. "Infrastructure Contracts: Trust and Institutional Updating," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 171-216, September.
  24. De Chiara, Alessandro, 2020. "Precontractual investment and modes of procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
  25. Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2012. "Contracts between Legal Persons [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
  26. Jean Beuve & Claudine Desrieux, 2011. "Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness," Post-Print hal-01463000, HAL.
  27. Marco Di Maggio & Marco Pagano, 2018. "Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing [Bargaining with incomplete information]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(1), pages 117-153.
  28. George Hendrikse & Patrick Hippmann & Josef Windsperger, 2015. "Trust, transaction costs and contractual incompleteness in franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 867-888, April.
  29. Oliver J. Board & Kim-Sau Chung, 2022. "Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 1-43, December.
  30. Liang Guo, 2021. "Partial Unraveling and Strategic Contract Timing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7719-7736, December.
  31. Xavier Gabaix, 2017. "Behavioral Inattention," NBER Working Papers 24096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. Oliver Walker, 2011. "Unawareness with �possible� possible worlds," GRI Working Papers 69, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  33. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Gromb, Denis & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2020. "The paradox of pledgeability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 591-605.
  34. Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, 2009. "Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1205-1238.
  35. Leon Yang Chu & David E. M. Sappington, 2010. "Contracting with private knowledge of signal quality," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 244-269, June.
  36. Roberto Rozzi, 2021. "Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-29, June.
  37. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 50-57.
  38. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
  39. Francesca Beccacece & Marco LiCalzi, 2024. "Generally acceptable principles for financial amortization: a modest proposal," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 47(2), pages 425-443, December.
  40. Ortoleva, Pietro, 2013. "The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of Thinking Aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 903-934.
  41. Zhongwen Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, 2023. "Strategic Information Suppression in Borrowing and Pre-Lending Cognition: Theory and Evidence," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-24, May.
  42. Gui, Zhengqing & Huang, Yangguang & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2024. "Financial fraud and investor awareness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 104-123.
  43. Canidio, Andrea & Karle, Heiko, 2022. "The focusing effect in negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 1-20.
  44. Nicholas S. Argyres & Teppo Felin & Nicolai Foss & Todd Zenger, 2012. "Organizational Economics of Capability and Heterogeneity," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(5), pages 1213-1226, October.
  45. Hui Xiong & Ying-Ju Chen, 2013. "Product Line Design with Deliberation Costs: A Two-Stage Process," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 225-244, September.
  46. Friederike Wall, 2024. "Incomplete incentive contracts in complex task environments: an agent-based simulation with minimal intelligence agents," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 19(3), pages 523-552, July.
  47. Daniel Danau, 2019. "Contract law and Contract theory. A survey and some considerations," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2019-04, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
  48. Surajeet Chakravarty & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2009. "Contracting in the shadow of the law," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 533-557, September.
  49. Jean Beuve & Claudine Desrieux, 2016. "Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 125-158, January.
  50. Auster, Sarah & Pavoni, Nicola, 2024. "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  51. Dokko, Jane K. & Keys, Benjamin J. & Relihan, Lindsay, 2019. "Affordability, financial innovation and the start of the housing boom," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 101017, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  52. Lee, Daeyong & Lee, Ju-Yeon & Josephson, Brett W., 2024. "Effects of bid protests against government agencies on firm performance: Role of interorganisational relationship," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 520-540.
  53. Hideshi Itoh, 2023. "What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 333-354, July.
  54. Arnald J. Kanning, 2020. "Agreement by conduct as a coordination device," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 19(1), pages 77-90, June.
  55. Dessi, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital," TSE Working Papers 09-075, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  56. Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  57. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  58. Zhao, Xiaojian, 2011. "Framing contingencies in contracts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 31-40, January.
  59. Tirole, Jean & Gomes, Renato & Bourguignon, Hélène, 2014. "Shrouded Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 10171, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  60. Ola Bengtsson & Na Dai, 2014. "Financial Contracts in PIPE Offerings: The Role of Expert Placement Agents," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 43(4), pages 795-832, December.
  61. Alessandro De Chiara, 2018. "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers 2018_5, Department of Economics, Central European University.
  62. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 102, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
  63. Martijn Cremers, 2017. "What Corporate Governance Can Learn from Catholic Social Teaching," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 145(4), pages 711-724, November.
  64. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2021. "Unawareness without AU Introspection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
  65. Claudine Desrieux & Jean Beuve, 2011. "Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(3), pages 2030-2040.
  66. Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2020. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2194-2212, May.
  67. Christoph Heinzel, 2013. "Schumpeter and Georgescu-Roegen on the foundations of an evolutionary analysis," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 37(2), pages 251-271.
  68. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
  69. Ajay Agrawal & Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018. "Prediction, Judgment, and Complexity: A Theory of Decision-Making and Artificial Intelligence," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, pages 89-110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  70. Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, 2012. "Incorporating unawareness into contract theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 181-194.
  71. Ying-Ju Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, 2013. "Solution Concepts of Principal-Agent Models with Unawareness of Actions," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-24, August.
  72. D'Acunto, Francesco & Xie, Jin & Yao, Jiaquan, 2022. "Trust and contracts: Empirical evidence," LawFin Working Paper Series 32, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
  73. Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
  74. Zhengqing Gui & Yangguang Huang & Xiaojian Zhao, 2018. "Whom to Educate? Financial Fraud and Investor Awareness," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2018-52, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Jan 2018.
  75. Prateek Goorha, 2018. "Contextual Contracts: On a Context-sensitive Approach to Contract Theory," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 30(2), pages 191-209, July.
  76. Jean Beuve & Claudine Desrieux, 2011. "Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01463000, HAL.
  77. Ari Hyytinen & Frode Steen & Otto Toivanen, 2019. "An Anatomy of Cartel Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2155-2191.
  78. Bengtsson, Ola & Sensoy, Berk A., 2011. "Investor abilities and financial contracting: Evidence from venture capital," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 477-502, October.
  79. repec:bri:cmpowp:13/325 is not listed on IDEAS
  80. Mark Grinblatt & Seppo Ikäheimo & Matti Keloharju & Samuli Knüpfer, 2016. "IQ and Mutual Fund Choice," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 924-944, April.
  81. Evan Piermont, 2023. "Iterated Revelation: How to Incentive Experts to Complete Incomplete Contracts," Papers 2304.05142, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  82. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847.
  83. Daido, Kohei & Morita, Kimiyuki & Murooka, Takeshi & Ogawa, Hiromasa, 2013. "Task assignment under agent loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 35-38.
  84. Burkhard C. Schipper & Oliver Board & Kim-Sau Chung, 2009. "Two Models of Unawareness: Comparing the object-based and subjective-state-space approaches," Working Papers 93, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  85. Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 858-894, October.
  86. Dongyeol Lee, 2015. "The Competitive Effect of Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of Renegotiation Breakdown," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(1), pages 25-50, August.
  87. Ernst-Ludwig Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2014. "Multi-task agency with unawareness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 197-222, August.
  88. Liang Guo, 2023. "Gathering Information Before Negotiation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 200-219, January.
  89. Välilä, Timo, 2020. "An overview of economic theory and evidence of public-private partnerships in the procurement of (transport) infrastructure," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
  90. Francesco D'Acunto & Jin Xie & Jiaquan Yao, 2020. "Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 8714, CESifo.
  91. Benjamin Bental & Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2020. "Interpreting contracts: the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 241-265, October.
  92. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Rational attitude change by reference cues when information elaboration requires effort," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 90-107.
  93. Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J., 2009. "Cooperation under incomplete contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  94. Benjamin Young, 2022. "Misperception and Cognition in Markets," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-15, October.
  95. Bourguignon, Hélène & Gomes, Renato & Tirole, Jean, 2019. "Shrouded transaction costs: must-take cards, discounts and surcharges," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 99-144.
  96. Oliver Board & Kim-Sau Chung & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2008. "Two Models of Unawareness," Working Paper 379, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2009.
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