Cooperation under incomplete contracting
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2009026
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Jean Tirole, 2009.
"Cognition and Incomplete Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 265-294, March.
- Tirole, Jean, 2008. "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 453, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Laurence Kranich & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2005.
"Core Concepts For Dynamic Tu Games,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 43-61.
- Peters, H.J.M. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2001. "Core concepts for dynamic TU games," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Grossman, Sanford J., 1977. "A characterization of the optimality of equilibrium in incomplete markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, June.
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2006.
"Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete,"
Studies in Economic Theory, in: Christian Schultz & Karl Vind (ed.), Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency, chapter 12, pages 225-244,
Springer.
- P. Herings & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2005. "Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(1), pages 135-154, January.
- HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles, 1998. "Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Polemarchakis, H. M. & Herings, P. J. J., 2000. "Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete," HEC Research Papers Series 694, HEC Paris.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Polemarchakis, H.M., 2000. "Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- P. J. J. Herings & H. M. Polemarchakis, 2003. "Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market is Incomplete," Discussion Papers 03-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Jean-Jacques Herings & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 2000. "Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market is Incomplete," Working Papers hal-00598233, HAL.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Polemarchakis, H.M., 1999. "Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete," Other publications TiSEM e8494eae-638c-4951-8a6b-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Polemarchakis, H.M., 1999. "Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete," Discussion Paper 1999-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Polemarchakis, H.M., 2003. "Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market Is Incomplete," Research Memorandum 035, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Jean-Jacques Herings & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1998. "Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market is Incomplete," Working Papers hal-00601578, HAL.
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1999. "Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market Is Incomplete," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1210, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999.
"Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998. "Foundations of incomplete contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19354, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Atsushi Kajii & Antonio Villanacci & Alessandro Citanna, 1998.
"Constrained suboptimality in incomplete markets: a general approach and two applications,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 495-521.
- Alessandro Citanna & Atsushi Kajii & Antonio Villanacci, 1998. "Constrained suboptimality in incomplete markets: a general approach and two applications," Post-Print hal-00479390, HAL.
- KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas C., 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1428, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006.
"The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
- Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P.J.J. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2002. "The weak sequential core for two-period economies," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Predtetchinski A. & Herings P.J.J. & Perea A., 2002. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Game Theory and Information 0203008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002.
"The strong sequential core for two-period economies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
- P.J.J. Herings & H. Peeters, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Microeconomics 0111002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P.J.J. & Peters, H.J.M., 2001. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1977. "Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 131-137, August.
- Rafael Repullo, 1988. "The Core of an Economy with Transaction Costs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(3), pages 447-458.
- Becker, Robert A & Chakrabarti, Subir K, 1995. "The Recursive Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 401-423, March.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011.
"Core concepts for incomplete market economies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 595-609.
- Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1119, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
- Chander, Parkash & Wooders, Myrna, 2020.
"Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2010. "Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1008, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002.
"The strong sequential core for two-period economies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
- P.J.J. Herings & H. Peeters, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Microeconomics 0111002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P.J.J. & Peters, H.J.M., 2001. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Habis, Helga, 2012. "Sztochasztikus csődjátékok - avagy hogyan osszunk szét egy bizonytalan méretű tortát? [Stochastic bankruptcy games. How can a cake of uncertain dimensions be divided?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1299-1310.
- Bhowmik Anuj & Gabriella Graziano Maria, 2020.
"Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Anuj Bhowmik & Maria Gabriella Graziano, 2018. "Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies," CSEF Working Papers 510, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002.
"The strong sequential core for two-period economies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
- P.J.J. Herings & H. Peeters, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Microeconomics 0111002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Predtetchinski,Arkadi & Herings,Jean-Jacques, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2016. "The Subgame Perfect Core," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Gonzalez, Stéphane & Rostom, Fatma Zahra, 2022. "Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-10.
- Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2010.
"A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(04), pages 407-416.
- Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J., 2010. "A note on the weak sequential core of dynamic TU games," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006.
"The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
- Predtetchinski, A. & Herings, P.J.J. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2002. "The weak sequential core for two-period economies," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Predtetchinski A. & Herings P.J.J. & Perea A., 2002. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Game Theory and Information 0203008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Imma Curiel, 2015. "Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 65-82, February.
- Helga Habis & P. Herings, 2013.
"Stochastic bankruptcy games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 973-988, November.
- Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J., 2011. "Stochastic bankruptcy games," Research Memorandum 045, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2012. "Stochastic Bankruptcy Games," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1205, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Ulrich Schwalbe, 1999. "The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 155-185, June.
- Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011.
"Transferable utility games with uncertainty,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2126-2139, September.
- Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J., 2010. "Transferable utility games with uncertainty," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1120, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 2022. "Coalitions with limited coordination," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 439-456, April.
- Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018.
"Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-20.
- Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2009-11-14 (Game Theory)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2009026. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Willems or Leonne Portz (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/meteonl.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.