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Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Motta, Massimo & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," TSE Working Papers 22-1370, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  3. Antonio Penta & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2022. "Rationalizability, Observability, and Common Knowledge," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(2), pages 948-975.
  4. Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018. "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 245-279.
  5. Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  6. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
  7. Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Safe Implementation," Working Papers 1363, Barcelona School of Economics.
  8. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  9. Nicholas C Bedard & Jacob K Goeree & Ningyi Sun, 2023. "Multivariate Majorization in Principal-Agents Models," Papers 2308.13804, arXiv.org.
  10. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  11. Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "One-step-ahead implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 110-126.
  12. Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Constrained implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 546-567.
  13. Chen, Yi-Chun & Mueller-Frank, Manuel & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022. "Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  14. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2021. "Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences," Papers 2109.11536, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  15. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A network solution to robust implementation: The case of identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers 1776, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  16. Ollar, Mariann & Penta, Antonio, 2021. "Efficient Full Implementation via Transfers: Uniqueness and Sensitivity in Symmetric Environments," TSE Working Papers 21-1262, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  17. Giuseppe Lopomo & Luca Rigotti & Chris Shannon, 2021. "Uncertainty in Mechanism Design," Papers 2108.12633, arXiv.org.
  18. Crawford, Vincent P., 2021. "Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 80-101.
  19. Kneeland, Terri, 2022. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  20. Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
  21. Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
  22. Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Informational robustness of common belief in rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 592-597.
  23. Manili, Julien, 2024. "Order independence for rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 152-160.
  24. Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro, 2024. "Auction design with heterogeneous priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 413-425.
  25. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Continuous level-k mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 481-501.
  26. Joseph Feffer, 2024. "Scoring Auctions with Coarse Beliefs," Papers 2410.06150, arXiv.org.
  27. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2020. "Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 108-116.
  28. Gavan, Malachy James & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Safe Implementation," TSE Working Papers 22-1369, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  29. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers 1676, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  30. Gabriel Ziegler, 2021. "Informational Robustness of Common Belief in Rationality," Papers 2103.02402, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  31. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Efficient Full Implementation via Transfers: Uniqueness and Sensitivity in Symmetric Environments," Working Papers 1311, Barcelona School of Economics.
  32. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically Robust Implementation," Working Papers 1461, Barcelona School of Economics.
  33. Bernhard Kasberger, 2022. "An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics," Papers 2202.07517, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
  34. Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Coalition-proof full efficient implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 659-677.
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