IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/aea/aecrev/v107y2017i3p690-713.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
  2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
  3. Dur, Umut & Hammond, Robert G. & Kesten, Onur, 2021. "Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  4. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_124, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  5. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2020. "Custodial Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2020-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  6. Evans, R., Reiche, S. & Reiche, S., 2022. "When is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2222, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  7. Raymond Deneckere & Sergei Severinov, 2022. "Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1334-1370, August.
  8. S Nageeb Ali & Greg Lewis & Shoshana Vasserman, 2023. "Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 538-571.
  9. Bertomeu, Jeremy, 2023. "Managers’ choice of disclosure complexity," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2).
  10. Wu, Jiemai, 2020. "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  11. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  13. D'Agostino, Elena & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2022. "The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 328-336.
  14. Frenkel, Sivan & Guttman, Ilan & Kremer, Ilan, 2020. "The effect of exogenous information on voluntary disclosure and market quality," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 176-192.
  15. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  16. Avi Lichtig & Helene Mass, 2024. "Optimal Testing in Disclosure Games," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_543, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  17. Cheng Li, 2020. "Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 527-557, April.
  18. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
  19. Shaofei Jiang, 2020. "Equilibrium Refinement in Finite Action Evidence Games," Papers 2007.06403, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
  20. , & Frechette, Guilaume & Perego, Jacopo, 2019. "Rules and Commitment in Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 14085, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023. "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
  22. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
  23. Schopohl, Simon, 2019. "Full revelation under optional verification," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 14-16.
  24. Yichuan Lou, 2023. "Private Experimentation, Data Truncation, and Verifiable Disclosure," Papers 2305.04231, arXiv.org.
  25. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
  26. Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen, 2022. "Implementation with Uncertain Evidence," Papers 2209.10741, arXiv.org.
  27. Lichtig, Avi & Weksler, Ran, 2023. "Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  28. Kosenko, Andrew & Stiglitz, Joseph & Yun, Jungyoll, 2023. "Bilateral information disclosure in adverse selection markets with nonexclusive competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 144-168.
  29. Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023. "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  30. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1631-1660, July.
  31. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," Papers 1908.05556, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  32. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  33. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2020. "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Papers 2007.00907, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  34. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
  35. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Jacopo Perego, 2022. "Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2283-2318, September.
  37. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
  38. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida, 2021. "Designing Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2021-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  39. Shaofei Jiang, 2019. "Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces," Papers 1910.13633, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
  40. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.
  41. Li, Run, 2021. "Disclosure with unknown expertise," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  42. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  43. repec:ema:worpap:2021-02_v2 is not listed on IDEAS
  44. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2022. "The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation," Papers 2208.14829, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.