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But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
  2. Aislinn Bohren & Troy Kravitz, 2016. "Optimal Contracting with Costly State Verification, with an Application to Crowdsourcing," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Jun 2016.
  3. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2014. "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," Working Papers 062-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  4. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
  5. Rahman, David M., 2024. "Detecting profitable deviations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  6. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  7. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2014. "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," NBER Working Papers 20315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
  9. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001479, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Gershkov, Alex & Li, Jianpei & Schweinzer, Paul, 2016. "How to share it out: The value of information in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 261-304.
  11. Parimal K. Bag & Peng Wang, 2019. "Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 467-495, October.
  12. Bag, Kanti Parimal & Pepito, Nona, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," ESSEC Working Papers WP1603, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
  13. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2023. "Self-evident events and the value of linking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  14. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  15. Azrieli, Yaron, 2022. "Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 240-254.
  16. Esther Duflo & Michael Greenstone & Nicholas Ryan, 2013. "Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(4), pages 1499-1545.
  17. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  18. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
  19. Fu, Hu & Haghpanah, Nima & Hartline, Jason & Kleinberg, Robert, 2021. "Full surplus extraction from samples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  20. Raphael Auer & Cyril Monnet & Hyun Song Shin, 2021. "Permissioned Distributed Ledgers and the Governance of Money," Diskussionsschriften dp2101, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  21. Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret Meyer, 2018. "Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(4), pages 819-854, December.
  22. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 88-91.
  23. , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  24. Auer, Raphael & Shin, Hyun Song & Monnet, Cyril, 2021. "Distributed Ledgers and the Governance of Money," CEPR Discussion Papers 16752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Celislami, Elda & Kastoryano, Stephen & Mastrobuoni, Giovanni, 2023. "Strategic Bureaucratic Opacity: Evidence from Death Investigation Laws and Police Killings," IZA Discussion Papers 16609, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  26. Bag, Parimal K. & Wang, Peng, 2019. "Input, output or mixed monitoring in teams?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 471-492.
  27. Bruno Strulovici, 2020. "Can Society Function Without Ethical Agents? An Informational Perspective," Papers 2003.05441, arXiv.org.
  28. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2016. "Peer discipline and incentives within groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 19-30.
  29. Hino, Yoshifumi, 2019. "An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 47-53.
  30. Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  31. Andrei Barbos, 2022. "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 119-154, March.
  32. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "The Value of Delegated Quality Control and Market Size with an Application to Kyrgyzstan Dairy," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235707, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  33. Seung Han Yoo, 2016. "Organizational Design with Non-Contractible Quality," Discussion Paper Series 1604, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  34. Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_011_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  35. Kanti Parimal Bag & Nona Pepito, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," Working Papers hal-01282735, HAL.
  36. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001449, David K. Levine.
  37. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
  38. Aldashev, Gani & Zanarone, Giorgio, 2017. "Endogenous enforcement institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 49-64.
  39. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  40. Bhaskar, V. & Olszewski, Wojciech & Wiseman, Thomas, 2024. "Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
  41. Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 858-894, October.
  42. Prüfer, Jens, 2018. "Trusting privacy in the cloud," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 52-67.
  43. Emilio Bisetti & Benjamin Tengelsen & Ariel Zetlin‐Jones, 2022. "Moral Hazard In Remote Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1595-1623, November.
  44. Lawrence Busch, 2014. "Governance in the age of global markets: challenges, limits, and consequences," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer;The Agriculture, Food, & Human Values Society (AFHVS), vol. 31(3), pages 513-523, September.
  45. Music, Kasim & Salzmann, Christian, 2020. "Why biased agencies could be the best monitors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
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