IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zur/econwp/457.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium in the Tullock contest

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Ewerhart

Abstract

It is shown that the two-player Tullock contest admits precisely one equilibrium in randomized strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Ewerhart, 2024. "On the uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium in the Tullock contest," ECON - Working Papers 457, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:econwp:457
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/264143/1/econwp457.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 59-71, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    2. Balart, Pau & Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2017. "Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 126-130.
    3. Daniel Graydon Stephenson, 2023. "Multi-battle contests over complementary battlefields," Working Papers 2303, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
    4. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
    6. Dziubiński, M. & Goyal, S. & Zhou, J., 2024. "Interconnected Conflict," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2408, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022. "All-pay auctions with ties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1183-1231, November.
    8. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    9. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2023. "On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 180-199.
    10. Gehrig, Thomas & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2022. "Intermediation and price volatility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    11. Dziubiński, M. & Goyal, S. & Zhou, J., 2024. "Interconnected Conflict," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2403, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Paul Pecorino, 2020. "Bridge burning and escape routes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 399-414, September.
    13. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2024. "Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 526-556.
    14. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contest success functions: the common-pool perspective," ECON - Working Papers 195, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    15. Nicolas de Roos & Alexander Matros & Vladimir Smirnov, 2024. "Elimination tournaments with resource constraints," Working Papers 2024-06, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    16. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
    17. Ewerhart, Christian, 2024. "A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 52-59.
    18. Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auctions," ECON - Working Papers 155, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    19. repec:lan:wpaper:156630581 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 167-170.
    21. Segev, Ella, 2020. "Crowdsourcing contests," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 281(2), pages 241-255.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tullock contest; mixed equilibrium; sequence spaces; Cauchy matrices; Dirichlet series;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zur:econwp:457. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Severin Oswald (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/seizhch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.