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Efficiency and Equity: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Rent-Seeking

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  • Ben J. Heijdra
  • Pim Heijnen

Abstract

We study the rent-seeking phenomenon using a simple, static general equilibrium model. The economy consists of two sectors, both employing a constant returns-to-scale technology with labor as its sole input. One of the sectors is a monopoly, where a continuum of agents compete for a share of monopoly profits (i.e. rent). Agents are heterogeneous in labor productivity and rent-seeking ability: they face a choice between engaging in (productive) work or vying for a share of the rent (i.e. a contest against other rent-seekers). At the aggregate level, rent-seeking reduces the available amount of labor in the economy and thereby lowers output and welfare (rent-seeking is inefficient). At the individual level, rent-seeking shifts income towards rent-seekers. Consequently, an economy with few rent-seekers tends to have high income inequality: an effect that is exacerbated by the fact that rent is decreasing in the number of rent-seekers (low levels of rent-seeking increase inequity). This tradeoff between efficiency and equity is the primary focus of this paper. We investigate how the distribution of rent-seeking ability and the correlation between labor productivity and rent-seeking ability shape this tradeoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben J. Heijdra & Pim Heijnen, 2021. "Efficiency and Equity: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Rent-Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series 9375, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9375
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent-seeking; economic waste; inequality; monopolization; contest;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical

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