IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/1681.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Eine empirische Analyse von Sanktionen für Arbeitslose in Westdeutschland während der 1980er und 1990er Jahre

Author

Listed:
  • Wilke, Ralf A.

Abstract

Diese Arbeit soll einen ersten Einblick in die Sanktionsinstrumente Sperrzeit und Säumniszeit für Leistungsempfänger der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit geben. Die Forschung basiert auf umfangreichen Individualdatensätzen der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, der IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe und betrachtet den Zeitraum 1980-1997. Nach 57% aller Sanktionen im Laufe eines Leistungsbezuges bezieht der betroffene Arbeitslose innerhalb von sechs Tagen wieder eine Leistung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, meistens, weil die Sanktionen aus wichtigen Gründen zurückgenommen wurden. Nur 41% aller ausgesprochenen Sanktionen können tatsächlich als sanktionierend angesehen werden. Aufgrund dieser Ergebnisse ist es zweifelhaft, dass eine nicht differenzierte Aktivierungspolitik für Arbeitslose mit einer dadurch verbundenen vermehrten Aussprache von Sperrzeiten und Säumniszeiten durchweg einen positiven Effekt hat, da der Verwaltungsmehraufwand aufgrund der hohen Rücknahmequote von Sanktionen in vielen Fällen nicht durch den erwarteten Nutzen gedeckt sein kann.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilke, Ralf A., 2003. "Eine empirische Analyse von Sanktionen für Arbeitslose in Westdeutschland während der 1980er und 1990er Jahre," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-71, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:1681
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24021/1/dp0371.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jaap H. Abbring & Gerard J. Berg & Jan C. Ours, 2005. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 602-630, July.
    2. Rafael Lalive & Jan C. van Ours & Josef Zweimüller, 2005. "The Effect Of Benefit Sanctions On The Duration Of Unemployment," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1386-1417, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Müller, Kai-Uwe, 2007. "Observed and unobserved determinants of unemployment insurance benefit sanctions in Germany: Evidence from matched individual and regional administrative data," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2007-107, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Boockmann, Bernhard & Thomsen, Stephan L. & Walter, Thomas, 2009. "Intensifying the use of benefit sanctions: an effective tool to shorten welfare receipt and speed up transitions to employment?," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-072, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. repec:bla:germec:v:11:y:2010:i::p:336-366 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Wolff, Joachim & Moczall, Andreas, 2012. "Übergänge von Alg-II-Beziehern in die erste Sanktion : Frauen werden nur selten sanktioniert," IAB-Forschungsbericht 201211, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boone, Jan & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & van Ours, Jan C., 2009. "Experiments on unemployment benefit sanctions and job search behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 937-951, November.
    2. Bruno Crépon & Muriel Dejemeppe & Marc Gurgand, 2005. "Counseling the unemployed: does it lower unemployment duration and recurrence?," Working Papers halshs-00590769, HAL.
    3. Gerards, Ruud & Welters, Ricardo, 2016. "Impact of financial pressure on unemployed job search, job find success and job quality," ROA Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
    4. Gerard J. van den Berg & Bas van der Klaauw, 2005. "Job Search Monitoring and Sanctions," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(2), pages 26-29, 07.
    5. repec:zbw:rwidps:0037 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. van den Berg, Gerard J. & Uhlendorff, Arne & Wolff, Joachim, 2013. "Sanctions for young welfare recipients," Working Paper Series 2013:26, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    7. Bart Cockx & Muriel Dejemeppe & Andrey Launov & Bruno Van der Linden, 2018. "Imperfect Monitoring of Job Search: Structural Estimation and Policy Design," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 75-120.
    8. Mergele, Lukas & Weber, Michael, 2020. "Public employment services under decentralization: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    9. Stefanie Behncke & Markus Frölich & Michael Lechner, 2010. "Unemployed and their caseworkers: should they be friends or foes?," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 173(1), pages 67-92, January.
    10. Clausen, Jens & Heinesen, Eskil & Hummelgaard, Hans & Husted, Leif & Rosholm, Michael, 2009. "The effect of integration policies on the time until regular employment of newly arrived immigrants: Evidence from Denmark," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 409-417, August.
    11. Cairo, Sofie & Mahlstedt, Robert, 2023. "The disparate effects of information provision: A field experiment on the work incentives of social welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    12. Eskil Heinesen & Leif Husted & Michael Rosholm, 2013. "The effects of active labour market policies for immigrants receiving social assistance in Denmark," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-22, December.
    13. De Brouwer, Octave & Leduc, Elisabeth & Tojerow, Ilan, 2019. "The Unexpected Consequences of Job Search Monitoring: Disability Instead of Employment?," IZA Discussion Papers 12304, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Graversen, B.K. & van Ours, J.C., 2006. "How to Help Unemployed Find Jobs Quickly : Experimental Evidence from a Mandatory Activation Program," Discussion Paper 2006-126, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. Jan C. van Ours, 2006. "Leaving "Hotel California": How Incentives Affect Flows of Benefits in the Netherlands," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 75(3), pages 186-207.
    16. Schmieder, Johannes F & Trenkle, Simon, 2020. "Disincentive effects of unemployment benefits and the role of caseworkers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    17. van den Berg, Gerard J. & Uhlendorff, Arne & Wolff, Joachim, 2015. "Under heavy pressure : intense monitoring and accumulation of sanctions for young welfare recipients in Germany," IAB-Discussion Paper 201534, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    18. Barbara Hofmann, 2008. "Work Incentives? Ex Post Effects of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions - Evidence from West Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 2508, CESifo.
    19. Solenne Tanguy, 2006. "Recherche d'emploi : entre assurance et incitation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(1), pages 43-64.
    20. Gerard J. Berg & Johan Vikström, 2014. "Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(2), pages 284-334, April.
    21. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:1681. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zemande.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.