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Implementing Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Christian B. Jensen

    (University of Iowa, USA,Christian-Jensen@uiowa.edu)

Abstract

This article shows that member state governments' ability rather than their willingness to implement directives drives uneven implementation of European Union labor policy. Analysis of 186 labor policy infringement cases against 15 member states between 1978 and 2000 shows that administrative oversight mechanisms that concentrate authority in the hands of government and exclude interest group participation enhance governments' ability to resolve conflicts with the Commission over implementation. Mechanisms that depend on cooperation with interest groups inhibit the resolution of these conflicts. This finding undermines the common prescription that increasing interest group involvement should improve member state governments' implementation of EU laws.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian B. Jensen, 2007. "Implementing Europe," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 451-477, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:8:y:2007:i:4:p:451-477
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116507082810
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    References listed on IDEAS

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