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Election cycles in MPs' outside interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005-2010

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  • Geys, Benny

Abstract

Politicians often implement popular changes in public policies prior to elections, with the aim of improving their Election Day outcome. This research note evaluates whether such electioneering carries over also into politicians' extra-parliamentary activities. Evidence from the UK House of Commons over the period 2005-2010 suggests adjustments do occur in MPs' outside activities over the election cycle. The safety of the politicians' seat and his/her decision to stand for re-election play an important mediating role.

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  • Geys, Benny, 2011. "Election cycles in MPs' outside interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005-2010," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-104, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011104
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    Cited by:

    1. Dalle Nogare, Chiara & Kauder, Björn, 2017. "Term limits for mayors and intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Italian cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-11.
    2. Arnold, Felix & Kauder, Björn & Potrafke, Niklas, 2014. "Outside earnings, absence, and activity: Evidence from German parliamentarians," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 147-157.
    3. Bernecker, Andreas, 2014. "Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 55-70.
    4. Annika Havlik & Friedrich Heinemann & Justus Nover, 2021. "Election Cycles in European Public Procurement," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 77(4), pages 376-407.
    5. Gründler, Klaus & Potrafke, Niklas & Wochner, Timo, 2024. "The beauty premium of politicians in office," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 298-311.

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    Keywords

    Outside interests; election cycles; House of Commons;
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