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Affection, speed dating and heart breaking

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  • Konrad, Kai A.

Abstract

This paper explores the role of unilateral and idiosyncratic affection rents (love) from being married with a specific individual in a matching model with individuals with heterogenous matching frequencies. We show that individuals suffer in expectation from being matched with individuals with high matching frequency. High-frequency daters have high reservation utilities for entering into a marriage. This makes them turn down many offers and makes them appear as heart-breakers.

Suggested Citation

  • Konrad, Kai A., 2013. "Affection, speed dating and heart breaking," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-309, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2013309
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kai A. Konrad & Kjell Erik Lommerud, 2010. "Love and taxes - and matching institutions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 919-940, August.
    2. Raquel Fernández & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2005. "Love and Money: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(1), pages 273-344.
    3. Dan Anderberg & Yu Zhu, 2010. "The Effect of Education on Marital Status and Partner Characteristics: Evidence from the UK," CESifo Working Paper Series 3104, CESifo.
    4. Bloch, Francis & Ryder, Harl, 2000. "Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 93-115, February.
    5. Hofmann, Dirk & Qari, Salmai, 2011. "The law of attraction bilateral search and horizontal heterogeneity," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2011-017, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    6. Gregory D. Hess, 2004. "Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What's Love Got to Do with It?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 290-318, April.
    7. Ken Burdett & Melvyn G. Coles, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 141-168.
    8. Burdett, Kenneth & Coles, Melvyn G, 1999. "Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(456), pages 307-334, June.
    9. Alison Booth & Melvyn Coles, 2010. "Education, Matching, and the Allocative Value of Romance," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 744-775, June.
    10. James W. Boudreau & Vicki Knoblauch, 2010. "Marriage Matching and Intercorrelation of Preferences," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 587-602, June.
    11. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-979, December.
    12. Gautier, Pieter A. & Svarer, Michael & Teulings, Coen N., 2010. "Marriage and the city: Search frictions and sorting of singles," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 206-218, March.
    13. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
    14. Fali Huang & Ginger Zhe Jin & Lixin Colin Xu, 2012. "Love and Money by Parental Matchmaking: Evidence from Urban Couples in China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 555-560, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herrenbrueck, Lucas & Xia, Xiaoyu & Eastwick, Paul & Hui, Chin Ming, 2018. "Smart-dating in speed-dating: How a simple Search model can explain matching decisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 54-76.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage; affection rent; love; matching; non-hierarchical heterogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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