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One-sided learning about one fs own type in a two-sided search model: The case of n types of agents

Author

Listed:
  • Akiko Maruyama

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Marketing and Distribution Sciences, Tokyo, Japan)

Abstract

This study analyzes a two-sided search model in which agents are vertically heterogeneous and agents on one side do not know their own type. Agents with imperfect self-knowledge update their beliefs based on the offers or rejections they receive from others. The results are as follows. An agent with imperfect self-knowledge lowers his or her reservation level if the agent receives a rejection that leads him or her to revise belief downward. However, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise his or her reservation level even if the agent receives an offer that leads him or her to revise his or her belief upward. As a result, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge has the highest reservation level when he or she has just entered the market; after that, a series of meetings gradually lowers his or her reservation level over the duration of the search.

Suggested Citation

  • Akiko Maruyama, 2018. "One-sided learning about one fs own type in a two-sided search model: The case of n types of agents," GRIPS Discussion Papers 18-15, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:ngi:dpaper:18-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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