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Marriage and consumption insurance: what's love got to do with it?

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  • Gregory D. Hess

Abstract

This paper explores marriage?s role when markets are incomplete and individuals cannot diversify their idiosyncratic labor income risk. All else being equal, an individual would rather marry a ?hedge? (a person whose income is negatively correlated with her own) because doing so raises her expected utility. However, the existence of love complicates the picture: Although marrying a hedge is important, an individual may not do so if she finds someone with whom she shares a great deal of love. Is love more important to a lasting marriage than economic compatibility? To answer this question, the author develops a simple model in which rational individuals meet, enjoy marriage?s economic and nonpecuniary benefits (i.e., love), and then must decide whether to remain married or divorce.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory D. Hess, 2001. "Marriage and consumption insurance: what's love got to do with it?," Working Papers (Old Series) 0104, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0104
    DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-200104
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Ogaki, Masao & Zhang, Qiang, 2001. "Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion and Tests of Risk Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 515-526, March.
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    7. Rosenzweig, Mark R & Stark, Oded, 1989. "Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 905-926, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumption (Economics);

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

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