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Incentives for Collective Innovation

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  • Curello, Gregorio

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  • Curello, Gregorio, 2023. "Incentives for Collective Innovation," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277708, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277708
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/277708/1/vfs-2023-pid-87421.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. , & ,, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    2. Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69.
    3. Hanna Hottenrott & Bettina Peters, 2012. "Innovative Capability and Financing Constraints for Innovation: More Money, More Innovation?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 1126-1142, November.
    4. Michael L. Katz, 1986. "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 527-543, Winter.
    5. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Alex Deng & José Luis Montiel Olea & Justin Rao & E. Glen Weyl, 2020. "A/B Testing with Fat Tails," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(12), pages 4614-4000.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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