It's the occupation, stupid! Explaining candidates' success in low-information local elections
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Cited by:
- Sajons, Christoph, 2016. "Information on the ballot, voter satisfaction and election turnout," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 16/05, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
- Nicolas GAVOILLE & Jean-Michel JOSSELIN & Fabio PADOVANO, 2014. "What do you know about your mayor? Voters’ information and jurisdiction size," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2014-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy, revised Aug 2015.
- Ronny Freier & Sebastian Thomasius, 2016.
"Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(5), pages 875-910, October.
- Ronny Freier & Sebastian Thomasius, 2012. "Voters Prefer More Qualified Mayors, but Does It Matter for Public Finances?: Evidence for Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1262, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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More about this item
Keywords
low-information elections; local elections; occupational reputation; political economy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
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