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What do you know about your mayor? Voters’ information and jurisdiction size

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas GAVOILLE

    (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France)

  • Jean-Michel JOSSELIN

    (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France)

  • Fabio PADOVANO

    (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France, Department of Political Sciences, University Roma Tre, Italy)

Abstract

This papers empirically studies the relationship between the size of a jurisdiction and the information that voters acquire to cast their vote. If political agency models consider voters' information as exogenous, the literature on the endogenous acquisition of information suggests that the size of the jurisdiction impacts the quality of the information that voters acquire. We use the French municipal context to empirically verify this theoretical prediction. We study how the determinants of the reelection probability of the incumbent mayor change when the size of the jurisdiction varies. To do so, we define incumbent mayors' observable personal characteristics (such as age and gender) as low quality information, and proxy high quality information by an estimate of the incumbent's personal influence on the investment policy of the municipality during his/her mandate. Our results indicate that the larger the municipality, the lower the impact of mayor’s past policymaking on reelection probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas GAVOILLE & Jean-Michel JOSSELIN & Fabio PADOVANO, 2014. "What do you know about your mayor? Voters’ information and jurisdiction size," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2014-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy, revised Aug 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2014-01-ccr
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voters; municipal elections; information; political leaders; investment policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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