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It's the occupation, stupid! Explaining candidates' success in low-information elections

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  • Mechtel, Mario

Abstract

Do voters use ballot paper information on the personal characteristics of political candidates as cues in low-information elections? Using a unique dataset containing 4423 political candidates from recent elections in Germany, we show that candidates' occupations do play an important role in their electoral success. The occupational impact is far greater than gender or doctoral degree effects for a large number of occupations. We discuss three possible explanations for these “occupational effects”: (a) an occupation's public reputation, (b) the extent to which individuals carrying out certain occupations are known within their communities, and (c) occupation specific competence related to issues relevant for local politics. Looking at polls on the reputation/prestige of certain jobs, we find a strong correlation between an occupation's reputation and the electoral success of a candidate carrying out this occupation. Therefore, voters appear to use occupational reputation as a cue in low-information elections.

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  • Mechtel, Mario, 2014. "It's the occupation, stupid! Explaining candidates' success in low-information elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 53-70.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:53-70
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.11.008
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    Cited by:

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    3. Beach, Brian & Jones, Daniel B., 2016. "Business as usual: Politicians with business experience, government finances, and policy outcomes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 292-307.
    4. Makarski, Krzysztof & Tyrowicz, Joanna, 2019. "On welfare effects of increasing retirement age," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 718-746.
    5. de Pinto Marco & Goerke Laszlo, 2019. "Efficiency Wages in Cournot-Oligopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(4), pages 1-13, October.
    6. Nicolas GAVOILLE & Jean-Michel JOSSELIN & Fabio PADOVANO, 2014. "What do you know about your mayor? Voters’ information and jurisdiction size," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2014-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy, revised Aug 2015.
    7. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2017. "Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    8. Laszlo Goerke, 2016. "Tax Evasion in a Cournot Oligopoly with Endogenous Entry," IAAEG Discussion Papers until 2011 201605, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    9. Garz, Marcel, 2018. "Retirement, consumption of political information, and political knowledge," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 109-119.
    10. Fałkowski, Jan, 2016. "Promoting change or preserving the status quo? - the consequences of dominating local politics by agricultural interests. Some evidence on structural change in Poland during the transition period," 149th Seminar, October 27-28, 2016, Rennes, France 245115, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    11. Niklas Potrafke, 2024. "The Economic Consequences of Businesspeople in Politics: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 11502, CESifo.
    12. Gomberg, Andrei & Gutiérrez, Emilio & López, Paulina & Vázquez, Alejandra, 2019. "Coattails and the forces that drive them: Evidence from Mexico," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 64-81.
    13. Ronny Freier & Sebastian Thomasius, 2016. "Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(5), pages 875-910, October.
    14. Laszlo Goerke & Michael Neugart, 2020. "Thorstein Veblen, Joan Robinson, and George Stigler (probably) never met: Social Preferences, Monopsony, and Government Intervention," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202001, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; Low-information elections; Informational shortcuts; Occupational reputation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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