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Downs' ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie 2.0: Politische Präferenzen und Gleichheitsaversion

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  • Sell, Friedrich L.
  • Stratmann, Felix

Abstract

Nach einem kurzen Rückblick auf das Downs-Modell diskutieren wir anhand empirischer Daten aus Deutschland dessen heutige Relevanz unter Berücksichtigung der aus der Fairness-Literatur bekannten Ungleichheitsaversion (UA). Dabei wird der Begriff der sozialen Präferenzen um das neue Konzept der Gleichheitsaversion (GA) erweitert. Dies ermöglicht es, für Deutschland einen Einblick in den Zusammenhang zwischen den tatsächlichen individuellen politischen Präferenzen, dem gewünschten Niveau an gesamtgesellschaftlicher Einkommensumverteilung und der Verteilung von UA und GA in den individuellen sozialen Präferenzen zu gewinnen. Die Erweiterungen am Downs-Modell zeigen, dass - neben möglichen negativen Wohlfahrtseffekten - wegen der Rolle von GA eine zu hohe geplante Umverteilung eine Partei insgesamt erheblich Stimmen kosten kann.

Suggested Citation

  • Sell, Friedrich L. & Stratmann, Felix, 2011. "Downs' ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie 2.0: Politische Präferenzen und Gleichheitsaversion," Working Papers in Economics 2011,1, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20111
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    3. Maa[beta], Henrich & Sell, Friedrich L., 1998. "Confident expectations, rational expectations and the optimal conduct of monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 519-541, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Downs-Modell; Demokratie; politische Präferenzen; Gleichheitsaversion; Downs-Model; democracy; political preferences; eyuity aversion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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