The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information
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- Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Larcinese, Valentino, 2017. "The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 411-425, July.
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Cited by:
- Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences," MPRA Paper 68650, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Nov 2015.
- Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "The Voters' Curses: The Upsides and Downsides of Political Engagement," MPRA Paper 53482, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2018.
"Rational ignorance, populism, and reform,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 119-135.
- Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Rational ignorance, populism, and reform," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86371, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2015-01-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2015-01-09 (Positive Political Economics)
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