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Die Allokation des Verkehrsmengenrisikos bei Betreibermodellen für Straßeninfrastruktur: Theoretische Grundlagen und Anwendung auf das A-Modell

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  • Beckers, Thorsten
  • Miksch, Jan

Abstract

In diesem Beitrag werden auf Basis theoretischer Überlegungen Empfehlungen zur effizienten Allokation des Verkehrsmengenrisikos abgeleitet und auf Betreibermodelle für Bundesfernstraßen nach dem so genannten A-Modell angewandt. Es wird festgestellt, dass grundsätzlich eine Teilung des Verkehrsmengenrisikos zwischen Konzessionär und Nutzern einer Straßeninfrastruktur die optimale Lösung darstellt, was durch Konzessionen mit variabler Laufzeit nach dem Barwertverfahren zu erreichen ist. Da allerdings bei Projekten nach dem A-Modell eine Risikoübernahme durch die Nutzer nicht möglich ist, sollte der Großteil des Verkehrsmengenrisikos vom Staat getragen werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Beckers, Thorsten & Miksch, Jan, 2002. "Die Allokation des Verkehrsmengenrisikos bei Betreibermodellen für Straßeninfrastruktur: Theoretische Grundlagen und Anwendung auf das A-Modell," Discussion Papers 2002/10, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tubsem:200210
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thorsten Beckers & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2003. "Konzessionsmodelle für Fernstraßen in Deutschland: eine ökonomische Analyse der Risikoallokation beim F- und A-Modell," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 388, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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