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Forward guidance under disagreement: Evidence from the Fed's dot projections

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  • Detmers, Gunda-Alexandra

Abstract

This paper compares the effectiveness of date- and state-based forward guidance issued by the Federal Reserve since mid-2011 accounting for the influence of disagreement within the FOMC. Effectiveness is investigated through the lens of interest rates' sensitivity to macroeconomic news and I find that the Fed's forward guidance reduces the sensitivity and therefore crowds out other public information. The sensitivity shrinkage is stronger in the case of date-based forward guidance due to its unconditional nature. Yet, high levels of disagreement among monetary policy makers as published through the FOMC's dot projections since 2012 partially restore sensitivity to macroeconomic news. Thus, disagreement appears to lower the information content of forward guidance and to weaken the Fed's commitment as perceived by financial markets. The dot projections are therefore able to reduce the focal point character of forward guidance.

Suggested Citation

  • Detmers, Gunda-Alexandra, 2016. "Forward guidance under disagreement: Evidence from the Fed's dot projections," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2016-041, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2016-041
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    1. Gunda-Alexandra Detmers & Dieter Nautz, 2012. "The Information Content of Central Bank Interest Rate Projections: Evidence from New Zealand," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 323-329, September.
    2. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    3. Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012. "For the record," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 75, pages 67-79, September.
    4. Andrade, Philippe & Crump, Richard K. & Eusepi, Stefano & Moench, Emanuel, 2016. "Fundamental disagreement," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 106-128.
    5. Octavio Portolano Machado & Carlos Carvalho & Tiago Berriel, 2015. "Lift-off Uncertainty: What Can We Infer From the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections?," 2015 Meeting Papers 903, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Dovern, Jonas, 2015. "A multivariate analysis of forecast disagreement: Confronting models of disagreement with survey data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 16-35.
    7. Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012. "For the record," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 75, pages 36-46, December.
    8. Jeffrey R. Campbell & Charles L. Evans & Jonas D.M. Fisher & Alejandro Justiniano, 2012. "Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 43(1 (Spring), pages 1-80.
    9. Scott R. Baker & Nicholas Bloom & Steven J. Davis, 2016. "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(4), pages 1593-1636.
    10. Detmers, Gunda-Alexandra & Nautz, Dieter, 2014. "Stale forward guidance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 358-361.
    11. Philippe Andrade & Gaetano Gaballo & Eric Mengus & Benoît Mojon, 2019. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 1-29, July.
    12. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    13. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    14. Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012. "For the Record," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 75, pages 31-38, June.
    15. Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012. "For the record," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 75, pages 46-53, March.
    16. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Tillmann, Peter, 2021. "Financial markets and dissent in the ECB’s Governing Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    2. Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Strasser, Georg, 2019. "Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
    3. Peter Tillmann, 2020. "Financial Markets and Dissent in the ECB’s Governing Council," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202048, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    4. Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Central Bank Communication and Disagreement about the Natural Rate Hypothesis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(2), pages 81-123, June.
    5. Davide Romelli & Hamza Bennani, 2021. "Disagreement inside the FOMC: New Insights from Tone Analysis," Trinity Economics Papers tep1021, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Forward guidance; central bank communication; central bank interest rate projections; monetary policy committee; disagreement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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