Agency-Theorie, Informationskosten und Managervergütung
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Kürsten, Wolfgang, 2013. "35 Jahre Jensen/Meckling und das Missverständnis um die (wahre) Zielfunktion der Aktionäre – Finanzierungstheoretisches Plädoyer zur Eignung der Principal-Agent-Theorie für die Lösung von Problemen de," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 67(1), pages 8-22.
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