IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/pp1859/25.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Foreign debt, capital controls, and secondary markets: Theory and evidence from Nazi Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Papadia, Andrea
  • Schioppa, Claudio A.

Abstract

We show how elite capture affects optimal debt repatriations and management of official reserves under capital controls, bridging literature on debt buybacks and secondary markets. The model we provide guides our study of one of history's largest debt repatriations -in 1930s Germany. Authorities kept private repatriations under strict control -avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects- while allowing discretionary repatriations so to reap internal political benefits. German assets exhibited large spreads between their domestic and foreign prices, granting arbitrage profits to those who had forex access. New data reveals that spread dynamics were affected by the impact of capital controls on secondary markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Papadia, Andrea & Schioppa, Claudio A., 2020. "Foreign debt, capital controls, and secondary markets: Theory and evidence from Nazi Germany," Working Papers 25, German Research Foundation's Priority Programme 1859 "Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour", Humboldt University Berlin.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:pp1859:25
    DOI: 10.18452/22060
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/226035/1/173744903X.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.18452/22060?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas Ferguson & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008. "Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 101-137.
    2. Jushan Bai, 1997. "Estimation Of A Change Point In Multiple Regression Models," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(4), pages 551-563, November.
    3. Jushan Bai & Pierre Perron, 1998. "Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple Structural Changes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(1), pages 47-78, January.
    4. Alexander Guembel & Oren Sussman, 2009. "Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1297-1320.
    5. Gurnain Kaur Pasricha, 2020. "Estimated Policy Rules for Capital Controls," IMF Working Papers 2020/080, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    7. Olivier Accominotti & Barry Eichengreen, 2016. "The mother of all sudden stops: capital flows and reversals in Europe, 1919–32," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 69(2), pages 469-492, May.
    8. Broner, Fernando & Erce, Aitor & Martin, Alberto & Ventura, Jaume, 2014. "Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 114-142.
    9. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
    10. Pablo D'Erasmo & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2016. "Distributional Incentives In An Equilibrium Model Of Domestic Sovereign Default," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 7-44, February.
    11. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    12. Cohen, Daniel & Verdier, Thierry, 1995. "'Secret' buy-backs of LDC debt," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 317-334, November.
    13. Kilian Huber & Volker Lindenthal & Fabian Waldinger, 2021. "Discrimination, Managers, and Firm Performance: Evidence from “Aryanizations” in Nazi Germany," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(9), pages 2455-2503.
    14. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    15. Wright, Mark L.J., 2006. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 120-149, June.
    16. Nicolas Magud & Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, 2005. "Capital Controls: Myth and Reality A Portfolio Balance Approach to Capital Controls," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2006-10, University of Oregon Economics Department.
    17. Kim Oosterlinck & John Landon-lane, 2006. "Hope Springs Eternal – French Bondholders and the Soviet Repudiation (1915–1919)," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 10(4), pages 507-535, December.
    18. A.O. Ritschl, 2001. "Nazi economic imperialism and the exploitation of the small: evidence from Germany’s secret foreign exchange balances, 1938-1940[While I wa]," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 54(2), pages 324-345, May.
    19. Arnaud Costinot & Guido Lorenzoni & Iván Werning, 2014. "A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(1), pages 77-128.
    20. repec:bla:econom:v:69:y:2002:i:276:p:655-69 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Durdu, Ceyhun Bora & Mendoza, Enrique G. & Terrones, Marco E., 2009. "Precautionary demand for foreign assets in Sudden Stop economies: An assessment of the New Mercantilism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 194-209, July.
    22. Froot, Kenneth A, 1989. "Buybacks, Exit Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt and Liquidity Relief," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(1), pages 49-70, February.
    23. Michael P. Dooley, 1996. "A Survey of Literature on Controls over International Capital Transactions," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(4), pages 639-687, December.
    24. Nicolas E. Magud & Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2018. "Capital Controls: Myth and Reality--A Portfolio Balance Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 1-47, May.
    25. Reinhart, Carmen M. & Smith, R. Todd, 2002. "Temporary controls on capital inflows," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 327-351, August.
    26. Paul R. Krugman, 1988. "Market-Based Debt-Reduction Schemes," NBER Working Papers 2587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Jennie Bai & Shang-Jin Wei, 2012. "When Is There a Strong Transfer Risk from the Sovereigns to the Corporates? Property Rights Gaps and CDS Spreads," NBER Working Papers 18600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1991. "Sovereign Debt Repurchases: No Cure for Overhang," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1219-1235.
    29. Filippo Brutti & Philip Sauré, 2016. "Repatriation Of Debt In The Euro Crisis," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 145-174, February.
    30. Tahoun, Ahmed, 2014. "The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 86-110.
    31. Bruce E. Hansen, 2001. "The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in U.S. Labour Productivity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 117-128, Fall.
    32. Michael W. Klein, 2012. "Capital Controls: Gates versus Walls," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 43(2 (Fall)), pages 317-367.
    33. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 92-96, May.
    34. Lorenz Emter & Martin Schmitz & Marcel Tirpák, 2019. "Cross-border banking in the EU since the crisis: What is driving the great retrenchment?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(2), pages 287-326, May.
    35. Reinhart, Karmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2009. ""This time is different": panorama of eight centuries of financial crises," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 77-114, March.
    36. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.
    37. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2015. "Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten," Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 2(4), pages 5-17, June.
    38. Klug, A., 1993. "The German Buybacks, 1932-1939: A Cure for Overhang?," Princeton Studies in International Economics 75, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    39. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Which Capitalism? Lessons Form The East Asian Crisis," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 11(3), pages 40-48, September.
    40. Andrés Fernández & Michael W Klein & Alessandro Rebucci & Martin Schindler & Martín Uribe, 2016. "Capital Control Measures: A New Dataset," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 64(3), pages 548-574, August.
    41. Toniolo,Gianni Assisted by-Name:Clement,Piet, 2005. "Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930–1973," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521845519.
    42. Aitor Erce, 2012. "Selective sovereign defaults," Globalization Institute Working Papers 127, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    43. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 391-435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    44. Filippo Brutti & Philip U. Sauré, 2014. "Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis: Evidence for the Secondary Market Theory," Working Papers 2014-03, Swiss National Bank.
    45. Eichengreen, Barry & Portes, Richard, 1988. "Foreign Lending in the Interwar Years: The Bondholders' Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    46. Broner, Fernando & Didier, Tatiana & Erce, Aitor & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2013. "Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 113-133.
    47. Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), 2014. "Handbook of International Economics," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 4, number 4.
    48. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 215-268, November.
    49. Kejriwal, Mohitosh & Perron, Pierre & Zhou, Jing, 2013. "Wald Tests For Detecting Multiple Structural Changes In Persistence," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 289-323, April.
    50. Laura Alfaro & Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan & Vadym Volosovych, 2007. "Capital Flows in a Globalized World: The Role of Policies and Institutions," NBER Chapters, in: Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices, and Consequences, pages 19-72, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    51. Atish R. Ghosh & Jonathan D. Ostry & Charalambos G. Tsangarides, 2017. "Shifting Motives: Explaining the Buildup in Official Reserves in Emerging Markets Since the 1980s," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 65(2), pages 308-364, June.
    52. Tai-leung Chong, Terence, 1995. "Partial parameter consistency in a misspecified structural change model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 351-357, October.
    53. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "The Buyback Boondoggle," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(2), pages 675-704.
    54. Atish R Ghosh & Jun I Kim & Mahvash S Qureshi, 2020. "What’s in a name? That which we call capital controls," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 35(101), pages 147-208.
    55. Fernando A. Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2008. "Enforcement Problems and Secondary Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 683-694, 04-05.
    56. Oosterlinck, Kim, 2003. "The bond market and the legitimacy of Vichy France," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 326-344, July.
    57. Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "The German Twin Crisis of 1931," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 822-871, September.
    58. Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-382, February.
    59. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "Serial Default and the "Paradox" of Rich-to-Poor Capital Flows," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 53-58, May.
    60. Ritschl, Albrecht, 2012. "The German Transfer Problem, 1920-1933: A Sovereign Debt Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 9062, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    61. Beck, Roland & Georgiadis, Georgios & Gräb, Johannes, 2016. "The geography of the great rebalancing in euro area bond markets during the sovereign debt crisis," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(PA), pages 449-460.
    62. Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes., 1988. "Settling Defaults in the Era of Bond Finance," Economics Working Papers 8885, University of California at Berkeley.
    63. Bai, Jushan, 1997. "Estimating Multiple Breaks One at a Time," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 315-352, June.
    64. Björn Tyrefors Hinnerich & Per Pettersson‐Lidbom, 2014. "Democracy, Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919–1938," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 961-993, May.
    65. Schularick, Moritz & Steger, Thomas M., 2008. "The Lucas Paradox and the quality of institutions: then and now," Discussion Papers 2008/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    66. Timothy W. Guinnane, 2004. "Financial Vergangenheitsbewältigung: The 1953 London Debt Agreement," Working Papers 880, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    67. Ritschl, Albrecht, 2019. "Financial destruction: confiscatory taxation of Jewish property and income in Nazi Germany," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100727, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    68. Willard, Kristen L & Guinnane, Timothy W & Rosen, Harvey S, 1996. "Turning Points in the Civil War: Views from the Greenback Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 1001-1018, September.
    69. Clement, Piet, 2004. ": Nazi Germany and the service of the Dawes and Young Loans," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(01), pages 33-50, April.
    70. H. K. Heuser, 1934. "The German Method of Combined Debt Liquidation and Export Stimulation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 1(3), pages 210-217.
    71. Jushan Bai & Pierre Perron, 2003. "Computation and analysis of multiple structural change models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(1), pages 1-22.
    72. Michael W. Klein, 2012. "Capital Controls: Gates versus Walls," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 45(2 (Fall)), pages 317-367.
    73. Eichengreen, Barry & Accominotti, Olivier, 2013. "The Mother of All Sudden Stops: Capital Flows and Reversals in Europe, 1919-1932," CEPR Discussion Papers 9670, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    74. Lee Buchheit & Chanda DeLong & Guillaume Chabert & Jeromin Zettlemeyer, 2019. "How to Restructure Sovereign Debt: Lessons from Four Decades," Working Paper Series WP19-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    75. Junsoo Lee & Mark C. Strazicich, 2003. "Minimum Lagrange Multiplier Unit Root Test with Two Structural Breaks," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1082-1089, November.
    76. Stone, Mark R., 1991. "Are sovereign debt secondary market returns sensitive to macroeconomic fundamentals? Evidence from the contemporary and interwar markets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1, Supple), pages 100-122, March.
    77. Peter Temin, 2008. "The German crisis of 1931: evidence and tradition," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 2(1), pages 5-17, April.
    78. Valerio Della Corte & Stefano Federico, 2019. "Two tales of foreign investor outflows: Italy in 2011-2012 and 2018," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 535, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    79. Toniolo,Gianni Assisted by-Name:Clement,Piet, 2007. "Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930–1973," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521043700.
    80. Ritschl, Albrecht, 2019. "Financial destruction: confiscatory taxation of Jewish property and income in Nazi Germany," Economic History Working Papers 100727, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    81. Pierre Perron, 2005. "Dealing with Structural Breaks," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-017, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Òscar Jordà & Katharina Knoll & Dmitry Kuvshinov & Moritz Schularick & Alan M Taylor, 2019. "The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870–2015," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(3), pages 1225-1298.
    2. Ho, Tai-kuang & Yeh, Kuo-chun, 2019. "Were capital flows the culprit in the Weimar economic crisis?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    2. Lovchikova, Marina & Matschke, Johannes, 2024. "Capital controls and the global financial cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    3. Josefin Meyer & Carmen M Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2022. "Sovereign Bonds Since Waterloo," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1615-1680.
    4. Engler, Philipp & Große Steffen, Christoph, 2016. "Sovereign risk, interbank freezes, and aggregate fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-61.
    5. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2015. "The Pitfalls of External Dependence: Greece, 1829–2015," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 46(2 (Fall)), pages 307-328.
    6. Mark Wright, 2018. "The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2018 Meeting Papers 928, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Norring, Anni, 2022. "Taming the tides of capital: Review of capital controls and macroprudential policy in emerging economies," BoF Economics Review 1/2022, Bank of Finland.
    8. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    9. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy [Greek bond buyback boondoggle]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 28(75), pages 513-563.
    10. Bilge Erten & Anton Korinek & José Antonio Ocampo, 2021. "Capital Controls: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 45-89, March.
    11. Jaume Ventura & Fernando Broner, 2008. "Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization," 2008 Meeting Papers 747, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Eswar S. Prasad & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2008. "A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberalization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(3), pages 149-172, Summer.
    13. Ghosh, Atish R. & Ostry, Jonathan D. & Qureshi, Mahvash S., 2018. "Taming the Tide of Capital Flows: A Policy Guide," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262037165, April.
    14. Fernando Broner & Jaume Ventura, 2016. "Rethinking the Effects of Financial Globalization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(3), pages 1497-1542.
    15. Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel, 2014. "Sovereign Debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 647-687, Elsevier.
    16. Richard J. Nugent, 2019. "Restrictions on Short-Term Capital Inflows and the Response of Direct Investment," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 350-383, June.
    17. Christoph Trebesch, 2019. "Resolving sovereign debt crises: the role of political risk," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 421-444.
    18. Forbes, Kristin & Fratzscher, Marcel & Kostka, Thomas & Straub, Roland, 2016. "Bubble thy neighbour: Portfolio effects and externalities from capital controls," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-104.
    19. Engel, Charles, 2016. "Macroprudential policy under high capital mobility: policy implications from an academic perspective," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 162-172.
    20. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign risk; Capital controls; Elite capture; Germany; Nazi regime; Foreign debt; Secondary markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:pp1859:25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.experience-expectation.de/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.