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Diskretionäre Wechselkursregime: Erfahrungen aus dem Europäischen Währungssystem, 1979-1998

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  • Höpner, Martin
  • Spielau, Alexander

Abstract

Im Kontext der Eurokrise wird mitunter der Übergang in ein diskretionäres Wechselkursregime diskutiert, das seinen Teilnehmern politisch verhandelte Auf- und Abwertungen ermöglichen würde. Über die Wünschbarkeit und die Wirkungsweisen solcher Auf- und Abwertungen finden sich in der Debatte unterschiedlichste Annahmen. Das Papier unternimmt daher einen Rückblick auf das Europäische Währungssystem (EWS), das von 1979 bis 1998 Bestand hatte. Es beruhte auf Interventionsverpflichtungen zur kurzfristigen Stabilisierung der Wechselkurse, ermöglichte aber die Neuaushandlung der Währungsparitäten, wenn die Preisentwicklungen in den teilnehmenden Ländern zu heterogen wurden. Insgesamt fanden im EWS 62 Wechselkursanpassungen zu 18 unterschiedlichen Zeitpunkten statt. Die Wechselkursanpassungen halfen bei der kurzfristigen Minimierung von Leistungsbilanzungleichgewichten, verhinderten aber nicht die mittelfristige Neuentstehung von Anpassungsdruck. Auf Abwertungen erfolgten keine Inflationsschübe und auf Aufwertungen keine Wachstumseinbrüche. Auch entstand kein Abwertungswettlauf, sondern vielmehr eine persistente Spaltung von Ländern unter Auf- und Abwertungsdruck. Ein erhebliches Manko des EWS war die politische Energie, die in regelmäßigen Abständen in die Neuaushandlung der Wechselkurse und damit in die "Pflege" des diskretionären Wechselkursregimes investiert werden musste. Mit diesem Problem sähe sich auch ein etwaig aus dem Euro hervorgehendes EWS II konfrontiert.

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  • Höpner, Martin & Spielau, Alexander, 2015. "Diskretionäre Wechselkursregime: Erfahrungen aus dem Europäischen Währungssystem, 1979-1998," MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/11, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:1511
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    References listed on IDEAS

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