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Neoliberal restructuring in Turkey: From state to oligarchic capitalism

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  • Karadag, Roy

Abstract

How have neoliberal reform policies changed Turkey's political economy? The aim of this paper is to counter claims of convergence towards a liberal capitalist order. Given the historical dynamics of the political embeddedness of Turkey's economy, after 1980, transformations in the state and the economy institutionalized the erosion of Turkish state capitalism. Due to the consolidation of new elite cartels, political fragmentation, and continuing systemic corruption involving networks comprising political and economic elites, what emerged as a result of restructuring is an oligarchic form of capitalism. It is currently undergoing further institutional changes, the outcome of which will depend closely on the power resources and strategies of the incumbent moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party.

Suggested Citation

  • Karadag, Roy, 2010. "Neoliberal restructuring in Turkey: From state to oligarchic capitalism," MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/7, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bank, André & Karadag, Roy, 2012. "The Political Economy of Regional Power: Turkey under the AKP," GIGA Working Papers 204, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    2. Mehmet Turker & Zafer Konakli, 2016. "Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations on Forming Country Image and Developing the Country Brand Using Public Diplomacy," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 6(1), pages 221-235, January.
    3. Ciftci, Ilhan & Tatoglu, Ekrem & Wood, Geoffrey & Demirbag, Mehmet & Zaim, Selim, 2019. "Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: Evidence from Turkey," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 90-103.
    4. Jale Minibas-Poussard & Haluk Baran Bingöl & Christine Roland-Levy & Erkin Diyarbakirlioglu & Tutku Seckin-Celik, 2020. "Money, banks, and savings: A comparative analysis of Turkish laypeople's social representations over five periods (1999-2017)," Post-Print hal-02919362, HAL.

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