IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/kondp1/76.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the US

Author

Listed:
  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Schneider, Friedrich

Abstract

Popularity and reaction functions as the main relationships between the economic and political sectors are theoretically derived and empirically estimated with quarterly data for the U.S. One of the purposes is to endogenize government behavior in macro-econometric models. Unemploymentj inflation (negatively) and the growth of consumption (positively) influence presidential popularity. The presidents who fear not to be reelected use in turn their policy instruments (public expenditures and jobs) to increase their popularity. There is also some indication that the presidents pursue ideological goals when they are confident to win the upcoming election.

Suggested Citation

  • Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1976. "An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the US," Discussion Papers, Series I 76, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:76
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/68860/1/71789388X.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crotty, James R, 1973. "Specification Error in Macro-Econometric Models: The Influence of Policy Goals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(5), pages 1025-1030, December.
    2. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February.
    3. Lawrence Lau & Bruno Frey, 1971. "Ideology, public approval, and government behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 21-40, March.
    4. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    5. Ray C. Fair, 1975. "On Controlling the Economy to Win Elections," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 397, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Stephen M. Goldfeld & Alan S. Blinder, 1972. "Some Implications of Endogenous Stabilization Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 3(3), pages 585-644.
    7. repec:bla:kyklos:v:27:y:1974:i:2:p:227-54 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frey, Bruno S., 1976. "Theorie und Empirik politischer Konjunkturzyklen," Discussion Papers, Series I 75, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    2. Frey, Bruno S., 1978. "Politico-economic models and cycles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 203-220, April.
    3. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    4. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    5. Troeger, Vera & Schneider, Christina J., 2012. "Strategic Budgeteering and Debt Allocation," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 85, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    6. Belke, Ansgar, 2000. "Partisan Political Business Cycles in the German Labour Market? Empirical Tests in the Light of the Lucas-Critique," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 225-283, September.
    7. Franco Modigliani, 1977. "The monetarist controversy; or, should we forsake stabilization policies?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Spr suppl, pages 27-46.
    8. Resce, Giuliano, 2022. "The impact of political and non-political officials on the financial management of local governments," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 44(5), pages 943-962.
    9. Ramser, Hans Jürgen, 1977. "Anmerkungen zur Theorie politischer Konjunkturzyklen," Discussion Papers, Series I 105, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    10. Markus Reischmann, 2016. "Empirical Studies on Public Debt and Fiscal Transfers," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 63.
    11. Resce, Giuliano, 2022. "Political and Non-Political Officials in Local Government," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp22079, University of Molise, Department of Economics.
    12. Gonschorek, Gerrit J. & Schulze, Günther G. & Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko, 2018. "To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 240-260.
    13. Christopher J. Ellis & Mark A. Thoma, 1991. "Causality In Political Business Cycles," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(2), pages 39-49, April.
    14. Duchoslav, Jan & Kenamu, Edwin & Thunde, Jack, 2023. "Targeting hunger or votes? The political economy of humanitarian transfers in Malawi," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    15. Nathaniel Beck, 1978. "Social choice and economic growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 33-48, September.
    16. Jacques DEFOURNY, 1979. "Des Cycles Économiques Aux Cycles Politiques," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 43-56, October.
    17. Çağrı Levent Uslu, 2017. "Seat-vote elasticity and the provincial distribution of government spending in Turkey," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 7(1), pages 49-67, April.
    18. Peter Bloch, 1986. "The politico-economic behavior of authoritarian governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 117-128, January.
    19. Jean-Dominique Lafay & Friedrich Schneider & Werner Pommerehne, 1981. "Les interactions entre économie et politique : synthèse des analyses théoriques et empiriques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 32(1), pages 110-162.
    20. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fwkonde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.