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Decision making in politics and economics: 5. 2013 election to German Bundestag and direct democracy

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  • Tangian, Andranik S.

Abstract

The outcomes of the 2013 German Bundestag (federal parliament) election are analyzed from the viewpoint of direct democracy. For this purpose, the party positions on 36 topical issues are compared with the results of public opinion polls, and the party and coalition indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented) and universality (frequency in representing a majority) are constructed. It is shown that the 2013 election winner, the union of two conservative parties CDU/CSU with their 41.6% of the votes, is the least representative among the four parties eligible for parliament seats (with > 5% of the votes). The most representative among the eligible ones is the left party, DIE LINKE, which received only 8.6% of the votes. It is concluded that voters are not very consistent with their own political profiles, disregard party manifestos, and are likely driven by political traditions, even if outdated, or by personal images of politicians. Moreover, the actual practice of coalition formation further aggravates the low representativeness of the parliament. Thereby it is shown that representative democracy, as it is, guarantees no adequate representation of public opinion, even in Germany with its multiparty system and strong socialdemocratic traditions. To bridge the gap between representative and direct democracies, an alternative election procedure is proposed. For illustration, it is hypothetically applied to redistribute the Bundestag seats to increase its representativeness.

Suggested Citation

  • Tangian, Andranik S., 2013. "Decision making in politics and economics: 5. 2013 election to German Bundestag and direct democracy," Working Paper Series in Economics 49, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:49
    DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000037495
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andranik Tangian, 2013. "German parliamentary elections 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 833-869, March.
    2. Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour, 1998. "The paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 211-236.
    3. Berghammer, Rudolf & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & de Swart, Harrie, 2007. "Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 178(2), pages 530-542, April.
    4. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Harrie de Swart & Jan-Willem van der Rijt, 2005. "A new model of coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 129-154, September.
    5. Krause-Pilatus, Annabelle & Rinne, Ulf & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 2010. "Anonymisierte Bewerbungsverfahren," IZA Research Reports 27, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Miller, Nicholas R., 1983. "Pluralism and Social Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 734-747, September.
    7. Tangian, Andranik, 2012. "Statistical test for the mathematical theory of democracy," WSI Working Papers 179, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    8. Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andranik Tangian, 2017. "Policy Representation of a Parliament: The Case of the German Bundestag 2013 Elections," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 151-179, January.
    2. Tangian, Andranik S., 2018. "Testing the improved third vote during the 2018 election of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology student parliament," Working Paper Series in Economics 117, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    representative democracy; direct democracy; elections; coalitions; theory of voting; mathematical theory of democracy; indices of popularity and universality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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