IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v61y2006i3p251-276.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Does Separability Affect The Desirability Of Referendum Election Outcomes?

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Hodge
  • Peter Schwallier

Abstract

Recent research has shown that in referendum elections, the presence of interdependence within voter preferences can lead to election outcomes that are undesirable and even paradoxical. However, most of the examples leading to these undesirable outcomes involve contrived voting situations that would be unlikely to occur in actual elections. In this paper, we use computer simulations to investigate the desirability of referendum election outcomes. We show that highly undesirable election outcomes occur not only in contrived examples, but also in randomly generated elections. Our data suggest that the presence of interdependent preferences significantly increases the likelihood of such undesirable outcomes, and that certain alternative voting methods, such as sequential voting and setwise aggregation, hold the potential to produce outcomes that more accurately reflect the will of the electorate. Copyright Springer 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Hodge & Peter Schwallier, 2006. "How Does Separability Affect The Desirability Of Referendum Election Outcomes?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 251-276, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:3:p:251-276
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-006-9001-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-006-9001-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11238-006-9001-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour, 1998. "The paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 211-236.
    2. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. Bradley, W. James & Hodge, Jonathan K. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2005. "Separable discrete preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 335-353, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hodge, Jonathan K. & TerHaar, Micah, 2008. "Classifying interdependence in multidimensional binary preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 190-204, March.
    2. Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
    3. Clark Bowman & Jonathan Hodge & Ada Yu, 2014. "The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 111-124, June.
    4. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 551-569, July.
    5. Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 525-536, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 525-536, April.
    2. Lang, Jrme & Xia, Lirong, 2009. "Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 304-324, May.
    3. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 269-300, November.
    4. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 559-587, October.
    5. Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory," Working Papers halshs-01168767, HAL.
    6. Grandi, Umberto & Lang, Jérôme & Ozkes, Ali & Airiau, Stéphane, 2020. "Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda," SocArXiv y4m6r, Center for Open Science.
    7. Bradley, W. James & Hodge, Jonathan K. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2005. "Separable discrete preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 335-353, May.
    8. Simon Hug & George Tsebelis, 2002. "Veto Players and Referendums Around the World," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 465-515, October.
    9. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01304688 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Francesco Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2018. "A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 493-512, October.
    11. Mogens K. Justesen, 2007. "The Social Choice of EU Treaties," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 537-553, December.
    12. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
    13. Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, 2000. "A Problem with Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, January.
    14. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Kornhauser, Lewis A., 2010. "Only a dictatorship is efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 261-270, November.
    15. Hannu Nurmi, 2007. "Assessing Borda's Rule and Its Modifications," Discussion Papers 15, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    16. Tanguiane, Andranick S., 2022. "Analysis of the 2021 Bundestag elections. 4/4. The third vote application," Working Paper Series in Economics 154, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    17. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins & William Zwicker, 2016. "Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 301-333, February.
    18. Hannu Nurmi & Tommi Meskanen, 2000. "Voting Paradoxes and MCDM," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 297-313, July.
    19. Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew, 2008. "A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2240-2261, October.
    20. Daniel Bochsler, 2010. "The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 119-131, July.
    21. Andranik Tangian, 2021. "MCDM Application of the Third Vote," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 775-787, August.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:3:p:251-276. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.