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Ein Konzept der Anreizethik zur Weiterentwicklung der sozialen Grundsicherung nach Hartz IV

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  • Wilde, Joachim

Abstract

Die Reformdiskussion für die soziale Grundsicherung für Erwerbsfähige konzentriert sich in der Regel auf eine Verbesserung der finanziellen Anreize zur Aufnahme einer Erwerbstätigkeit und auf Maßnahmen des "workfare". Das vorliegende Papier verbreitert die Diskussion mit Hilfe eines Konzepts der Anreizethik. Dabei wird gezeigt, wie durch die Allokation sogenannter moralischer Güter durch die Mitarbeiter der Grundsicherungsbehörden zur Überwindung der Abhängigkeit von sozialer Grundsicherung angereizt werden kann. Das Konzept wird zunächst zur Bewertung der Hartz IV Reform genutzt. Es zeigt sich, dass diese teilweise zu einer Verschlechterung der Anreizstrukturen beiträgt. Der Artikel schließt mit Anregungen zur Beseitigung der aufgedeckten Mängel und mit einem Reformvorschlag im Sinne des anreizethischen Konzepts.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilde, Joachim, 2006. "Ein Konzept der Anreizethik zur Weiterentwicklung der sozialen Grundsicherung nach Hartz IV," IWH Discussion Papers 1/2006, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-1-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anreizethik; moralische Güter; soziale Grundsicherung; Arbeitslosengeld II; incentive ethics; moral goods; social assistance; long-term unemployed;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • I39 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Other
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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