IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ipewps/1622021.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

US economic sanctions on Cuba: An analysis of the reasons for their maintenance

Author

Listed:
  • Nahrstedt, Jan

Abstract

This paper investigates why the US economic embargo against Cuba is still in place, despite its lack of effectiveness towards the stated objectives of the US government. An explanatory approach with two theoretical frameworks from economics and political science is applied. The paper explores the assumption that the embargo is not in place to achieve a systemic change in Cuba, but rather because it satisfies certain interest groups in the US. An article with similar methodology from 1997 is updated, and the strength of established interest groups is re-evaluated. It is concluded that US interest groups supporting the maintenance of the sanctions against Cuba have significantly weakened since 1997. Additionally, the general US population's support for the embargo, while already weak in 1997, has further weakened and made a rapprochement of the US toward Cuba, especially under a Democratic Presidency, increasingly likely.

Suggested Citation

  • Nahrstedt, Jan, 2021. "US economic sanctions on Cuba: An analysis of the reasons for their maintenance," IPE Working Papers 162/2021, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ipewps:1622021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/234908/1/1759811068.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rafael Romeu, 2014. "The Vacation Is Over: Implications for the Caribbean of Opening U.S.-Cuba Tourism," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-27, January.
    2. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian & Steinbach, Armin, 2018. "Economic sanctions and human rights: Quantifying the legal proportionality principle," ILE Working Paper Series 12, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    3. Garfield, R. & Santana, S., 1997. "The impact of the economic crisis and the US embargo on health in Cuba," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 87(1), pages 15-20.
    4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, January.
    5. Lowenfeld, Andreas F., 2008. "International Economic Law," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199226948.
    6. Carlos Seiglie, 1997. "The Political Economy of Trade Sanctions: The Case of Cuba," Annual Proceedings, The Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, vol. 7.
    7. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde & Jung, Euijin, 2020. "What's new in economic sanctions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    8. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    9. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition softcover with CD," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4310, January.
    10. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, January.
    11. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, 2012. "The Democratic Deficit in the States," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 148-166, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    2. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yuka Ohno, 2015. "Nuclear bombs and economic sanctions," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(2), pages 635-646, October.
    3. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2024. "Political Economy of International Sanctions," Research Papers in Economics 2024-07, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    4. Daniel Berger & William Easterly & Nathan Nunn & Shanker Satyanath, 2013. "Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade during the Cold War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 863-896, April.
    5. Caruso Raul, 2003. "The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-36, April.
    6. Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou, 2019. "Do sanctions lead to a decline in civil liberties?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 191-215, September.
    7. Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2015. "The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 110-125.
    8. Joakim Gullstrand, 2020. "What goes around comes around: The effects of sanctions on Swedish firms in the wake of the Ukraine crisis," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(9), pages 2315-2342, September.
    9. Naghavi, Alireza & Pignataro, Giuseppe, 2015. "Theocracy and resilience against economic sanctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 1-12.
    10. Dizaji, S.F. & van Bergeijk, P.A.G., 2012. "Early phase success and long run failure of economic sanctions. With an application to Iran," ISS Working Papers - General Series 544, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    11. Philip I. Levy, 1999. "Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 415-420, May.
    12. Dreger, Christian & Kholodilin, Konstantin A. & Ulbricht, Dirk & Fidrmuc, Jarko, 2016. "Between the hammer and the anvil: The impact of economic sanctions and oil prices on Russia’s ruble," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 295-308.
    13. Daniel Verdier, 2009. "Sanctions as revelation regimes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 251-278, September.
    14. Alexandra Lukyanova & Ayaz Zeynalov, 2022. "Russian Agricultural Industry under Sanction Wars," Papers 2211.09205, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
    15. Denise Guthrie & Erick Duchesne, 2003. "(Mis)Selection Effects and Sovereignty Costs: An Alternative Measure of the Costs of Sanctions," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20032, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    16. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2021. "Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Life Expectancy and its Gender Gap," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(1), pages 139-162, January.
    17. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036, October.
    18. Michael Horowitz & Dan Reiter, 2001. "When Does Aerial Bombing Work?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 147-173, April.
    19. Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2003. "Economic Leverage and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Policy Briefs PB03-03, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    20. Matthieu Crozet & Julian Hinz, 2020. "Friendly fire: the trade impact of the Russia sanctions and counter-sanctions," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 35(101), pages 97-146.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    trade sanctions; Cuba; economic embargo; political interest groups;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ipewps:1622021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iphwrde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.