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The new institutional economics of antitrust and regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Bickenbach, Frank
  • Kumkar, Lars
  • Soltwedel, Rüdiger

Abstract

Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the economics of complex vertical and horizontal coordination problems. It sketches the specific view of NIE at industrial organization, antitrust and regulation, discusses three current issues – the European policy concerning complex vertical contracts, regulatory reform of the electricity industry and the allocation of regulatory competencies in the EU – and presents some implications of NIE for economic policy making, research and advisory activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Bickenbach, Frank & Kumkar, Lars & Soltwedel, Rüdiger, 1999. "The new institutional economics of antitrust and regulation," Kiel Working Papers 961, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:961
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
    2. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    3. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    4. Vickers, John, 1996. "Market Power and Inefficiency: A Contracts Perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 12(4), pages 11-26, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro, 2020. "Tropical medicine: The economics and the evolving practice of antitrust remedies in Brazil," Russian Journal of Economics, ARPHA Platform, vol. 6(3), pages 294-314, September.
    2. Kumkar, Lars, 2002. "The European Electricity Market: Centralization of Regulation or Competition between Regulatory Approaches?," Kiel Discussion Papers 387, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2005. "Der "more economic approach" in der Wettbewerbspolitik," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    4. Christian von Hirschhausen & Petra Opitz, 2001. "Power Utility Re-regulation in East European and CIS Transformation Countries (1990-1999): An Institutional Interpretation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 246, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Sichelschmidt, Henning, 2000. "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Privatfinanzierung von Verkehrsinfrastruktur," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2403, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. Neugebauer, Andrea, 2002. "Divergierende Fallentscheidungen von Wettbewerbsbehörden: Institutionelle Hintergründe," Arbeitspapiere 26, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    7. Onyeajuwa, Martha Kanene, 2017. "Institutions and consumers: Assertion of ordinary consumer interest in the Nigerian digital mobile telecommunications market," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 642-650.
    8. Kumkar, Lars, 2000. "Zur institutionellen Ausgestaltung der Strommarktregulierung: Brauchen wir eine eigenständige Regulierungsbehörde für den Stromtransport?," Kiel Discussion Papers 371, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    9. von Hirschhausen, Christian R. & Opitz, Petra, 2001. "Power utility re-regulation in East European and CIS transformation countries (1990 - 1999): An institutional interpretation," Discussion Papers 2001/7, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    New institutional economics; antitrust; regulation; incomplete contracts; regulatory reform; economic models of federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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