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Privatwirtschaftliche Koordinierungsstrukturen in vertikal strukturierten Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik

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  • Kumkar, Lars

Abstract

In diesem Papier werden privatwirtschaftliche Koordinierungsstrukturen in der Stromwirtschaft auf ihre Effizienzeigenschaften untersucht. Zu diesem Zweck werden zunächst die technischen Besonderheiten der Stromwirtschaft analysiert und hierbei insbesondere die vertikalen und horizontalen Koordinierungserfordernisse herausgearbeitet. Anschließend wird der analytische Rahmen einer institutionenökonomischen Untersuchung vertikal strukturierter Sektoren beschrieben. Im Hauptteil des Papiers werden die industrieökonomischen Konsequenzen der technischen Besonderheiten abgeleitet und auf ihre wohlfahrtstheoretischen Implikationen hin analysiert. Das Papier schließt mit einer Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse insbesondere hinsichtlich möglicher Marktmachtprobleme auf einzelnen vertikalen Stufen der Stromwirtschaft.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumkar, Lars, 1998. "Privatwirtschaftliche Koordinierungsstrukturen in vertikal strukturierten Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik," Kiel Working Papers 873, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:873
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    1. Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Sichelschmidt, Henning & Soltwedel, Rüdiger & Wolf, Hartmut, 2000. "Global strategic alliances in scheduled air transport – Implications for competition policy," Kiel Discussion Papers 370, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Sander, Birgit, 1998. "Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz," Kiel Working Papers 901, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Bickenbach, Frank, 1999. "Regulierung und Wettbewerb im Bereich der Netzinfrastrukturen: Begründung, Regeln und Institutionen," Kiel Working Papers 910, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Kumkar, Lars, 1999. "Zur zukünftigen Regulierungspolitik für die deutsche Stromwirtschaft," Kiel Working Papers 929, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Wenche Tobiasson & Christina Beestermöller & Tooraj Jamasb, 2016. "Public engagement in electricity network development: the case of the Beauly–Denny project in Scotland," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 43(2), pages 105-126, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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