Overconfidence and hygiene non-compliance in hospitals
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More about this item
Keywords
hospital acquired infections; hand hygiene; overconfidence; moral hazard; WHO guidelines;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2020-07-20 (Health Economics)
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