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Gender Prescribed Occupations and the Wage Gap

Author

Listed:
  • Broso, Matteo
  • Gallice, Andrea
  • Muratori, Caterina

Abstract

Men and women often sort into different jobs, and male-dominated jobs typically pay more than female-dominated ones. Why is that the case? We propose a model where workers have heterogeneous attitudes with respect to the social norms that define gender prescribed occupations and face endogenous social costs when entering jobs deemed "appropriate" for the other gender. We show that: (i) workers trade off identity and wage considerations in deciding where to work; (ii) asymmetric social norms contribute to the gender pay gap by deterring women from entering higher-paying male-dominated sectors; (iii) breaking social norms generates positive externalities, reducing social stigma for everyone. Therefore, in equilibrium, there are too few social norm breakers.

Suggested Citation

  • Broso, Matteo & Gallice, Andrea & Muratori, Caterina, 2024. "Gender Prescribed Occupations and the Wage Gap," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1529, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:1529
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1085-1107, September.
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    3. Das, Smita & Kotikula, Aphichoke, 2019. "Gender-Based Employment Segregation: Understanding Causes and Policy Interventions," Jobs Group Papers, Notes, and Guides 30947812, The World Bank.
    4. Erica L. Groshen, 1991. "The Structure of the Female/Male Wage Differential: Is It Who You Are, What You Do, or Where You Work?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 26(3), pages 457-472.
    5. Alice Schoonbroodt, 2018. "Parental child care during and outside of typical work hours," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 453-476, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Occupational Segregation; Wage Gap; Social Norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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