The Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions
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More about this item
Keywords
Corruption; Financial Markets; Institutions; Development; Voting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2006-08-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2006-08-05 (Development)
- NEP-FMK-2006-08-05 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-POL-2006-08-05 (Positive Political Economics)
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