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Congestion Management: From Physics to Regulatory Instruments

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  • Hirth, Lion
  • Glismann, Samuel

Abstract

In recent years, power flows in many European transmission and distribution networks have increased, making the management of network congestion a much-debated – and increasing politicized – topic. This paper is an introduction to and a review of congestion management in European electricity grids. We review the physical measures available to avoid congestion, using a newly introduced analytical framework. Also, we provide a com-prehensive review of regulatory instruments used and proposed to incentivize those measures. Finally, we provide a description of the implementation of three prominent instruments, including so-called redispatch.

Suggested Citation

  • Hirth, Lion & Glismann, Samuel, 2018. "Congestion Management: From Physics to Regulatory Instruments," EconStor Preprints 189641, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:189641
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/189641/1/Hirth%20%26%20Glismann%202018%20-%20Introduction%20to%20congestion%20management.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marques, Vítor & Bento, Nuno & Costa, Paulo Moisés, 2014. "The “Smart Paradox”: Stimulate the deployment of smart grids with effective regulatory instruments," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 96-103.
    2. Joskow Paul L., 2008. "Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity Networks," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 1-14, December.
    3. Ruester, Sophia & Schwenen, Sebastian & Batlle, Carlos & Pérez-Arriaga, Ignacio, 2014. "From distribution networks to smart distribution systems: Rethinking the regulation of European electricity DSOs," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 229-237.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    5. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Glismann, Samuel, 2021. "Ancillary Services Acquisition Model: Considering market interactions in policy design," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 304(C).
    2. Schönheit, David & Bruninx, Kenneth & Kenis, Michiel & Möst, Dominik, 2022. "Improved selection of critical network elements for flow-based market coupling based on congestion patterns," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 306(PA).
    3. Theo Dronne & Fabien Roques & Marcelo Saguan, 2021. "Local Flexibility Markets for Distribution Network Congestion-Management in Center-Western Europe: Which Design for Which Needs?," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-18, July.
    4. Hirth, Lion & Schlecht, Ingmar, 2020. "Market-Based Redispatch in Zonal Electricity Markets: The Preconditions for and Consequence of Inc-Dec Gaming," EconStor Preprints 194292, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, revised 2020.
    5. Ghaemi, Sina & Li, Xinyu & Mulder, Machiel, 2023. "Economic feasibility of green hydrogen in providing flexibility to medium-voltage distribution grids in the presence of local-heat systems," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 331(C).
    6. Schönheit, David & Bruninx, Kenneth & Kenis, Michiel & Möst, Dominik, 2021. "Improved selection of critical network elements for flow-based market coupling based on congestion patterns," EconStor Preprints 233467, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    7. Bellenbaum, Julia & Höckner, Jonas & Weber, Christoph, 2022. "Designing flexibility procurement markets for congestion management – investigating two-stage procurement auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    8. Schittekatte, Tim & Meeus, Leonardo, 2020. "Flexibility markets: Q&A with project pioneers," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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    Keywords

    Redispatch; Congestion Management;

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