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On some of the consequences of being possible to call early elections

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  • Caleiro, António

Abstract

This note presents some of the consequences due to the possibility of having early elections. First of all, elections, whether exogenously or endogenously determined, are relevant to challenge the well known neutrality principle of economic policies under rational expectations. Furthermore, in the particular case of being possible to admit early elections, the electoral advantages of right-wing parties in relation to left-wing parties suffer a diminishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Caleiro, António, 2005. "On some of the consequences of being possible to call early elections," EconStor Preprints 142735, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:142735
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, April.
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    3. Ellis, Christopher J & Thoma, Mark A, 1991. "Partisan Effects in Economies with Variable Electoral Terms," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(4), pages 728-741, November.
    4. Cargill, Thomas F & Hutchison, Michael M, 1991. "Political Business Cycles with Endogenous Election Timing: Evidence from Japan," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 733-739, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Early Elections; Median Voter; Partisan Policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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