IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cbscwp/188.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why do Only 5.5% of Black Men Marry White Women?

Author

Listed:
  • Wong, Linda

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Wong, Linda, 2002. "Why do Only 5.5% of Black Men Marry White Women?," Working Papers 188, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:188
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/262590/1/wp188.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zhenchao Qian, 1997. "Breaking the racial barriers: Variations in interracial marriage between 1980 and 1990," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 34(2), pages 263-276, May.
    2. Burdett, Kenneth & Coles, Melvyn G, 1999. "Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(456), pages 307-334, June.
    3. Montgomery, Mark R. & Sulak, Donna B., 1989. "Female first marriage in East and Southeast Asia : A Kiefer-Neumann model," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 225-240, April.
    4. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    5. Burdett, Kenneth & Ondrich, Jan I, 1985. "How Changes in Labor Demand Affect Unemployed Workers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-10, January.
    6. Burdett, Kenneth & Vishwanath, Tara, 1988. "Balanced Matching and Labor Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 1048-1065, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Linda Y. Wong, 2003. "Structural Estimation of Marriage Models," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(3), pages 699-728, July.
    2. Richard Rogerson & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2004. "Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market-A Survey," NBER Working Papers 10655, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Azuara, Oliver, 2011. "Effect of universal health coverage on marriage, cohabitation and labor force participation," MPRA Paper 35074, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Davi B. Costa, 2021. "Benefits of marriage as a search strategy," Papers 2108.04885, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    5. van den Berg, Gerard J. & van Vuuren, Aico, 2010. "The effect of search frictions on wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 875-885, December.
    6. Macours, Karen, 2002. "Insecurity Of Property Rights And Matching In The Tenancy Market," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19603, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Giolito, Eugenio, 2004. "A Search Model of Marriage with Differential Fecundity," IZA Discussion Papers 1082, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Simon D Woodcock, 2002. "Modeling Labor Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Matches," Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Technical Papers 2002-19, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    9. Hofmann, Dirk & Qari, Salmai, 2011. "The law of attraction bilateral search and horizontal heterogeneity," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2011-017, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    10. Friedrich Poeschel, 2008. "Assortative matching through signals," Working Papers halshs-00585986, HAL.
    11. Blanden, Joanne, 2005. "Amour et argent : mobilite intergenerationnelle et appariement conjugal d'apres le revenu des parents," Direction des études analytiques : documents de recherche 2005272f, Statistics Canada, Direction des études analytiques.
    12. Adachi, Hiroyuki, 2003. "A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 182-198, December.
    13. Akiko Maruyama, 2018. "One-sided learning about one fs own type in a two-sided search model: The case of n types of agents," GRIPS Discussion Papers 18-15, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    14. Blanden, Joanne, 2005. "Love and Money: Intergenerational Mobility and Marital Matching on Parental Income," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 2005272e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
    15. Thomas Gall & David Reinstein, 2020. "Losing face," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 164-190.
    16. Gould, Eric D. & Paserman, M. Daniele, 2003. "Waiting for Mr. Right: rising inequality and declining marriage rates," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 257-281, March.
    17. Gathmann, Christina & Garbers, Julio, 2023. "Citizenship and integration," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    18. Sebastian Negrusa & Brighita Negrusa & James Hosek, 2014. "Gone to war: have deployments increased divorces?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 473-496, April.
    19. John Kennes & John Knowles, 2015. "Liberalization of Birth Control and the Unmarried Share of Births. Evidence from Single Mothers in the Marriage Market," Economics Working Papers 2015-25, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    20. John Knowles & Guillaume Vandenbroucke, 2019. "Fertility Shocks And Equilibrium Marriage‐Rate Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1505-1537, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:188. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/gsuchus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.