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Environmental regulation, asymmetric information and foreign ownership

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  • Vislie,J.

    (University of Oslo, Department of Economics)

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  • Vislie,J., 2001. "Environmental regulation, asymmetric information and foreign ownership," Memorandum 07/2001, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2001_007
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    File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2001/Memo-07-2001.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Markusen James R. & Morey Edward R. & Olewiler Nancy D., 1993. "Environmental Policy when Market Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-86, January.
    3. Rauscher, Michael, 1994. "Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 1032, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Baron, David P., 1985. "Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 211-231, November.
    5. Armstrong, Mark, 1999. "Optimal Regulation with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 196-215, February.
    6. Motta, Massimo & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1994. "Does environmental dumping lead to delocation?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 563-576, April.
    7. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 163-181, March.
    8. Michael Hoel, 1997. "Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 241-259, June.
    9. Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
    10. Nicolas Curien & Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, 1998. "Pricing Regulation Under Bypass Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 259-279, Summer.
    11. Evan Kwerel, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601.
    12. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1996. "Industrial policy and politics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
    13. repec:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:365-88 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:2:p:241-59 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    16. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    17. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
    18. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1042-1061, December.
    19. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
    20. Armstrong, Mark & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Multi-dimensional screening:: A user's guide," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 959-979, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vislie, Jon, 2003. "Domestic Environmental Policy under Asymmetric Information: The role of foreign ownership, outside options and market power," Memorandum 19/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information;

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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