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Der KMD-Kartellcheck: Marktscreening nach Kartellstrukturen am Beispiel des deutschen Zementmarkts

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  • Lorenz, Christian

Abstract

Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) is a model that analyses real market processes with the help of time pattern analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently. The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of cartels via characteristic market process patterns. This is based on the assumption that existing cartels cause failures in observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from these patterns in order to find hidden cartels and to engage antitrust agencies inot additional more detailed audits.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenz, Christian, 2005. "Der KMD-Kartellcheck: Marktscreening nach Kartellstrukturen am Beispiel des deutschen Zementmarkts," Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 11, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cawmbg:11
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
    2. Veltins, Michael A. & Schaller, Armin & Blum, Ulrich, 2004. "The East German Cement Cartel : An Inquiry into Comparable Markets, Industry Structure, and Antitrust Policy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 04/04, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cartel; collusion; price fixing; collusive marker; cartel audit; market screening; cement; CFD;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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