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Corporate boards, interorganizational ties and profitability: The case of Japan

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  • Raddant, Matthias
  • Takahashi, Hiroshi

Abstract

We analyze the ties between 4,000 Japanese corporations in the time period from 2004 until 2013. We combine data about the board composition with ownership relationships and indicators of corporate profitability. We find that both the network of corporate board interlocks as well as the ownership network show a high degree of persistence. The overlap between these two networks is surprisingly small. In the analysis of the board composition we find that the number of outside board members is low yet increasing. Firms with large foreign shareholdership are at the forefront of this development. Upon retirement board members in central positions are replaced with similarly central executives, maintaining the general structure of the network. Women in corporate boards remain scarce. The connectivity of firms in the ownership and board network can be related to firm profitability. Firms that are linked to peers with above average profitability are likely more profitable than firms in other relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Raddant, Matthias & Takahashi, Hiroshi, 2020. "Corporate boards, interorganizational ties and profitability: The case of Japan," Economics Working Papers 2020-02, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:202002
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    Cited by:

    1. Mitja Steinbacher & Matthias Raddant & Fariba Karimi & Eva Camacho Cuena & Simone Alfarano & Giulia Iori & Thomas Lux, 2021. "Advances in the agent-based modeling of economic and social behavior," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(7), pages 1-24, July.
    2. Raddant, Matthias & Takahashi, Hiroshi, 2022. "Interdependencies of female board member appointments," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate board interlock; firm performance; firm networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • C55 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Large Data Sets: Modeling and Analysis

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