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Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests

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  • Rieck, Thomas

Abstract

In innovation contests, the progress of the competing firms in the innovation process is usually their private information. We analyze an innovation contest in which research firms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a fixed cost, but their progress is publicly announced. We make a comparison with the case of no information revelation: if the progress is disclosed, the expected profit of the firms is higher, but the expected profit of the sponsor is lower. Additionally, we show that firms may voluntarily reveal their information.

Suggested Citation

  • Rieck, Thomas, 2010. "Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 16/2010, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:162010
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina, 2020. "Designing Dynamic Research Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 270-289, November.
    2. Letina, Igor & Benkert, Jean-Michel, 2016. "Designing Dynamic Research Tournaments," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145738, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Dosis, Anastasios & Muthoo, Abhinay, 2019. "Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 52, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    4. Bo Chen & Bo Chen & Dmitriy Knyazev, 2022. "Information disclosure in dynamic research contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 113-137, March.
    5. Daniel P. Gross, 2017. "Performance feedback in competitive product development," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(2), pages 438-466, May.
    6. Matros, Alexander & Ponomareva, Natalia & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2022. "Search without looking," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    7. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Information Disclosure in Contests with Endogenous Entry: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5128-5150, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contest; innovation; information revelation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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